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Abstract 
Two forces are in tension as the Internet evolves.  One pushes toward 
interconnected common platforms; the other pulls toward fragmentation and 
proprietary alternatives.  Their interplay drives many of the contentious issues 
in cyberlaw, intellectual property, and telecommunications policy, including the 
fight over “network neutrality” for broadband providers, debates over global 
Internet governance, and battles over copyright online.  These are more than 
just conflicts between incumbents and innovators, or between “openness” and 
“deregulation.”  The roots of these conflicts lie in the fundamental dynamics of 
interconnected networks.  
Fortunately, there is an interdisciplinary literature on network properties, 
albeit one virtually unknown to legal scholars.  The emerging field of network 
formation theory explains the pressures threatening to pull the Internet apart, 
and suggests responses.  The Internet as we know it is surprisingly fragile.  To 
continue the extraordinary outpouring of creativity and innovation that the 
Internet fosters, policy makers must protect its composite structure against both 
fragmentation and excessive concentration of power. 
This paper, the first to apply network formation models to Internet law, 
shows how the Internet pulls itself together as a coherent whole.  This very 
process, however, creates and magnifies imbalances that encourage 
balkanization.  By understanding how networks behave, governments and 
other legal decision makers can avoid unintended consequences and target their 
actions appropriately.  A network-theoretic perspective holds great promise to 
inform the law and policy of the information economy. 
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UC Davis Law Review, Vol. 42, p. 343 (2009) 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 “Sadly, it looks like the period in which the Internet functions seamlessly  
is over.”1   — Vint Cerf 
 
 
Two forces are in tension as the Internet evolves.  One pushes toward 
interconnected common platforms; the other pulls toward fragmentation and 
proprietary alternatives.  The interplay of these forces drives many of the 
contentious issues in cyberlaw, intellectual property, and telecommunications 
policy.  These issues include the fight over “network neutrality”2 for broadband 
                                                        
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania.  Thanks to Richard Shell, Phil Weiser, James Grimmelman, 
Gerry Faulhaber, and the participants in the 2007 Wharton Colloquium on Media and 
Communications Law for advice on prior versions, and to Paul Kleindorfer for 
introducing me to the network formation literature. Thanks also to Julie Dohm and 
Lauren Murphy Pringle for research assistance. Contact: werbach@wharton.upenn.edu. 
1 Rana Foroohar, The Internet Splits Up, NEWSWEEK INT’L, May 15, 2006, at 38, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/47643.  Vint Cerf, co-creator of the core 
Internet protocol, is often called the “Father of the Internet.” 
2 See Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1234, 1269-70; Tim Wu, 
Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 141, 
143 (2003) [hereinafter Wu, Network Neutrality]; Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A 
User's Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 69, 86 (2004); Christopher S. Yoo, 
Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 37-39 (2005) [hereinafter Yoo, 
Beyond Network Neturality]; Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the 
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providers, debates over global Internet governance, and battles over online 
copyright protection.  These are more than just conflicts between incumbents and 
innovators, or between “openness” and “deregulation.”  The roots of these battles 
lie in the fundamental dynamics of interconnected networks.  Fortunately, there 
is an interdisciplinary literature on network properties, albeit one virtually 
unknown to legal scholars.3  The emerging field of network formation theory 
explains the pressures threatening to pull the Internet apart and suggests 
responses.4  The Internet as we know it is surprisingly fragile.5  To continue the 
extraordinary creativity and innovation that the Internet has and continues to 
foster, policy makers must protect its composite structure6 against both 
fragmentation and excessive concentration of power. 
Network formation theory helps explain the pressures around network 
integration that promote such beneficial interconnection on the Internet and the 
countervailing forces at work today.7  A new branch in the broader field of 
network science, network formation theory models what happens as networks 
add and remove connections.  Among other things, network formation theory 
shows that, as networks develop, they create new dominant nodes within the 
interconnected environment.8  As the network’s hubs grow increasingly powerful, 
they accumulate a growing share of value.  This creates two sources of tension.  
Those in the hubs see the opportunity to become more proprietary, and those 
outside the hubs worry that the hubs will dominate them.  Both tendencies 
produce reactions that mitigate the network’s connectivity and all the value it 
creates.9 
                                                                                                                                                       
Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1900-04 (2006) [hereinafter Yoo, 
Economics of Congestion]. 
See infra note 178. 
3 See Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Law and the Science of Networks:  An Overview 
and an Application to the “Patent Explosion,” 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293, 1295 n.6 
(2006) (“The application of network science to law is in its infancy.”). 
4 See infra Part III. 
5 See infra Part II. 
6 See infra Part I.B. 
7 See generally Matthew O. Jackson, The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and 
Social Networks, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC DESIGN 319 (S. Koray & M. Sertel eds., 2003) 
(summarizing the findings of network formation theory). 
8 See infra Part III. 
9 See infra Part III.C. 
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Network formation theory provides new insights for important legal and 
policy issues.  For instance, China’s efforts to develop its own Internet addressing 
systems represent a potential threat to the basic functioning of the Internet.10  
Moreover, the greatest danger that telephone and cable companies may pose to 
the Internet is not their discriminatory treatment of certain online content, but 
their consolidation of Internet backbone infrastructure.11  Furthermore, 
overzealous extension of online copyright protection threatens not only 
independent content creators, but also the massive constellation of businesses 
built on top of Internet search engines.  Policy makers must appreciate these 
risks and the dangers that common platforms create when they become 
restrictive monopolies.12 
Understanding Internet development through the lens of network formation 
theory also contributes to the larger project of network law.  In light of the 
growing economic and social significance of the Internet, skirmishes between 
network operators, content providers, users, equipment manufacturers, and 
governments have exploded along a variety of legal fronts.  Traditional notions of 
property rights or competition policy are ill suited for this new environment.13  
Yet efforts to develop novel legal frameworks for cyberspace have largely failed on 
both descriptive and normative grounds.14 
Network science, with its rigorous grounding in both abstract mathematics 
and empirical studies, can provide the basis for a new approach to cyberspace 
law.  Until now, although a few findings of network science researchers have 
received attention in legal scholarship, the network formation theories detailed 
here have not.15  This article begins the process of applying network formation 
theory to Internet law and policy.   
                                                        
10 See infra Part II.A.3. 
11 Backbones are the Internet’s long-distance links between local access networks.  See 
infra Part II.B.2. 
12 For a discussion of information platforms and their legal significance, see infra Part 
IV.C.1. 
13 See infra Part IV.C.1id. 
14 In other words, these new approaches neither described the actual behavior of 
private and governmental actors on the Internet nor offered sufficient guidance for policy 
makers.  See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?  ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 142 (2006). 
15 As of this writing, the sole reference in the LEXIS U.S. Law Review database to the 
extensive network formation writings of Stanford professor Matthew O. Jackson, a 
leading scholar in the field, is a footnote disclaiming the authors’ intent to address this 
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Part I outlines the structure of the Internet and the tensions it experiences 
between pressures toward centralization and decentralization.  Part II provides 
four major case studies of Internet fragmentation: addressing and governance, 
backbone interconnection, network neutrality, and content reuse.  Part III 
explores how network formation theory and other findings from network science 
explain these developments.  Part IV uses the teachings of network formation 
theory to analyze the history and development of the Internet.  It then suggests 
an approach for Internet law based on network formation principles. 
I.  THE FATE OF THE INTERNET 
A. Centralizing and Decentralizing Forces 
Like the railroad system or the electric power grid, the Internet is a collection 
of independent networks that coordinate their actions, forming what appears to 
be a seamless collective. This structure allows all users, application creators, and 
content providers to leverage the full power of the global inter-network.17  The 
Internet fosters innovation by eliminating transaction costs, enabling new 
services to emerge.18  Today, however, centrifugal19 forces of dissolution are 
ascendant.20  The growing potential for balkanization21 poses grave threats to the 
Internet as an engine of innovation, economic growth, and creative expression. 
The Internet thrives because its powerful inward-pulling, or “centripetal,”22 
forces promote interconnection and federation at every layer of functionality.23  
                                                                                                                                                       
body of research.  See infra note 242.  The phrase “network formation theory” does not 
appear in the database. 
17 See infra Part IV.B. 
18 See infra Part II.C. 
19 See supra note 22. 
20 See infra Part II. 
21 As used in this paper, “balkanization” means dissolution into distinct and 
potentially hostile sub-units.  No connection to the geographical region of the Balkan 
Mountains in Eastern Europe or the geopolitical history of that part of the world is 
implied. 
22 The terms “centripetal” and “centrifugal” are used generically in this paper to 
describe inward-pulling and out-pulling forces.  The terms come from Newtonian physics, 
but are not intended to refer to any specific physical phenomenon.  See LAWRENCE S. 
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The very name, “Internet,” is short for “inter-network.”  The Internet is a 
compound system that manifests itself as a single entity.  When President George 
W. Bush declared during a 2004 debate with John Kerry that, “I hear rumors on 
the Internets that we’re going to have a draft,” his use of the plural form was 
widely viewed as a gaffe.33  It is not obvious, however, why there is only one 
Internet, and not many Internets. 
The Internet pulls together heterogeneous parts and turns them into a 
seemingly uniform whole.  Devices, applications, and network links may have 
different capabilities.  Users may choose to purchase different levels of access but 
these are local variations within the Internet environment, not choices among 
competing Internets.34 
The existence of one unified Internet creates tremendous benefits because the 
network experiences what economists call increasing returns to scale.35  More 
users, network operators, device manufacturers, service providers, and content 
creators sharing a common environment produce a virtuous circle of 
exponentially greater value (both economic and social).36  Each user can access 
more resources (or other users) and each provider can reach more customers in a 
federated environment.  To take just a few examples, any user can exchange 
email with more than a billion other global Internet users; entrepreneurs can 
launch services like eBay or YouTube on top of the network and quickly turn 
them into multi-billion dollar businesses; and Google can index billions of pages 
to both organize the world’s information and power a phenomenally profitable 
and targeted advertising business. 
                                                                                                                                                       
LERNER, PHYSICS FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 129-30 (1996) (defining centripetal and 
centrifugal force). 
23 See infra Part I.B.  As used in this paper, “interconnection” is the linkage of two 
networks.  “Federation” is a deeper integration into a single virtual network. 
33 James Harding, A Draw Is as Good as a Win for Bush's Relieved Supporters, FIN. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at 7.  
34 See infra Part IV.A. 
35 See infra Part IV.B; see also W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH 
DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 1-4 (1994) (describing concept of increasing returns); 
George Gilder, Metcalfe's Law and Legacy, FORBES ASAP, Sept. 13, 1993, at S158 
(explaining significance of increasing returns for telecommunications). 
36 Network operators such as AT&T and Comcast operate physical networks that 
carry communications or data traffic.  Device manufacturers build end-user devices such 
as personal computers, mobile phones, and iPods.  Service providers, as used in this 
paper, are companies such as Google, eBay, and Amazon.com, which deliver functionality 
to customers using the Internet. 
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There are other significant benefits to the Internet’s federated structure.  
Common networks facilitate innovation independent of the infrastructure 
platform, which can create significantly more value than the network itself.37  In 
other words, a company such as Amazon.com need not worry about how its 
customers access the network.  It can deploy new services and features without 
making special arrangements with network operators.  Furthermore, open 
platforms promote democratic values of individual expression and 
empowerment.38  Finally, interconnected networks may foster economic growth 
by unleashing the diversity of human communication.39 
Nonetheless, the absence of alternative Internets is not a foregone conclusion.  
Many analogous platforms are balkanized in ways the Internet is not.  There are 
multiple stock markets, even though these are networked exchanges like the 
Internet.  Any telephone can call any other, but in the United States, a mobile 
phone from one carrier usually cannot be used to subscribe to another carrier.  
There are two competing formats for high-definition DVD players, despite the 
obvious benefits of standardization.40  Even in the history of digital information 
networks, the Internet’s uniformity is the exception, rather than the rule.  It took 
years for the dominant consumer online services such as AOL and Compuserve to 
even offer fully interoperable email, for example.41 
                                                        
37 See Brett Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 937 (2005) (noting that commons management 
principle “catalyzes innovation through the creation of and experimentation with new 
uses”). 
38 See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users:  Shifting the Deep Structures of 
Regulation Towards Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 
579 (2000) (promoting commons as more “effective means than traditional structural 
media regulation of securing robust democratic discourse and individual expressive 
freedom”). 
39 See Susan Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 359, 387-90 (2007) (“Our national economic policy . . . should be closely 
tied to communications policy that facilitates the interactive, group-forming attributes of 
the Internet.”). 
40 Sarah McBride & Phred Dvorak, Studios Strike HD-DVD Deals for Holiday 2005, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2004, at B1.  In this case, Sony’s Blu-ray format eventually 
triumphed over the competing HD-DVD format.  See Martin Fackler, Toshiba 
Acknowledges Defeat as Blu-ray Wins Format Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, at C2. 
41 See Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 552 (1998) (“Each of these computer networks was largely 
incompatible with the others, with the result that joining a bulletin board allowed you to 
communicate only with other members of that bulletin board. Interconnection protocols, 
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How did the Internet achieve its open, composite structure?  The answer is 
not obvious.  The Internet has no master control element that decides where 
information flows.42  Instead, individual routers and networks pass along packets 
of data between their origin and destination.  Moreover, the Internet is both 
global and, in most of the world, a creature of the private sector.43  Though it 
traces its roots to American military and government research networks, today’s 
commercial Internet is not a government-built system.44  Nor is it a pervasively 
regulated network like the public switched telephone network45 or virtually every 
other major communications network.46  External mandates cannot explain the 
Internet’s universality. 
Remarkably, for all the complexity and the rapid changes in their constituent 
technologies, the networks and systems that combine to form the Internet do so 
largely voluntarily.  The Internet pulls itself together. This behavior ⎯ 
coordination without a coordinator, competitive advantage without proprietary 
dominance ⎯ has enabled many of the Internet’s great achievements.   Despite 
this, the interconnected Internet faces significant challenges, as the next section 
explains. 
B. The Network at War with Itself 
Although the Internet has held together remarkably well, its composite 
architecture creates significant challenges.  Deeply rooted tensions become 
significant when a network becomes as economically and socially significant as 
                                                                                                                                                       
beginning with Usenet and SMTP, allowed messages to be transferred between different 
groups of networked computers.”). 
42 See Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado:  The Internet and Telecommunications 
Policy 20 (FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 29, 1997), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp29pdf.html (describing 
governance and management of internet). 
43 China is an obvious counter-example to private control of the Internet.  See infra 
Part II.A.3. 
44 See generally KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE:  
THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996) (detailing history of Internet); JOHN NAUGHTON, A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUTURE:  THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1999) (discussing same). 
45 The public switched telephone network refers to the global publicly accessible 
telephone system.  HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY 736 (22d ed. 2006).   
46 The Federal Communications Commission imposes extensive regulatory 
obligations on telephone networks, pursuant to the Communications Act.  47 U.S.C. §§ 
151-615(b) (2000). 
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the Internet is today.  Seemingly contradictory tendencies toward both 
centralization and decentralization are producing an array of conflicts that 
current legal frameworks do not adequately address.47 
At one level, the Internet is fundamentally democratizing and decentralizing.  
It empowers anyone to launch a new application and allows users to express 
themselves freely.48  In business, the Internet allows firms to globalize their 
operations and facilitates efficient collaboration among distributed employees, 
partners, contractors, and customers.49  In media, the Internet allows creators to 
deliver programming through a mesh of peer-to-peer servers,50 rather than a 
central archive.  Further, the Internet empowers users to exchange content 
directly rather than rely on traditional commercial distribution chains.51  In 
countless other areas, the Internet sweeps away traditional gatekeepers and 
places productive capacity in the hands of individuals.52  
Simultaneously, however, the Internet establishes new dominant centers to 
replace the old proprietary ones.  Google is a high-profile example.  In just a few 
years, Google has become an online colossus, dominating Internet search and 
advertising.53  Google is also threatening large and entrenched traditional media 
businesses by capturing viewers these businesses once controlled.  Unlike 
Microsoft in the operating system market, Google owns no proprietary 
                                                        
47 See infra Part II. 
48 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
49 See generally JOHN HAGEL & JOHN SEELY BROWN, THE ONLY SUSTAINABLE EDGE:  
WHY BUSINESS STRATEGY DEPENDS ON PRODUCTIVE FRICTION AND DYNAMIC SPECIALIZATION 
(2005) (describing business potential of pervasive global networks). 
50 Peer-to-peer means that computers connect to each other as peers, rather than 
through a hierarchical arrangement.  See Nelson Minar et al., A Network of Peers:  Peer-
to-Peer Models Through the History of the Internet, in PEER-TO-PEER:  HARNESSING THE 
POWER OF DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 3, 3-4 (Andy Oram ed., 2001). 
51 See Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons:  Towards a Political Economy of 
Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1246-47 (2003); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, 
Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951, 1003-06 (2004). 
52 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS:  HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 32 (2006). 
53 See Sarah Arnott, Discontent Flares Over Google’s ‘Dominance,’ THE INDEP., June 
16, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/discontent-flares-over-
googles-dominance-847920.html; Jim Kerstetter, Hitwise Provides More Proof of 
Google’s Search Dominance, CNET, Aug. 12, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-
10015300-93.html. 
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gateways.54  Its users are free to choose another search engine, and Google’s 
primary function is to send those users away to other sites.  Yet Google continues 
to increase its revenue, profits, and market share despite the best efforts of 
powerful competitors such as Microsoft and Yahoo!.55 
Across the board, whether it be YouTube in online video sharing, eBay in 
auctions, or Facebook and MySpace in social networking, the leading Internet 
players may be new, but they dominate their markets at least as much as Wal-
Mart or Intel dominate theirs.56  The world may be flat, to use Thomas 
Friedman’s memorable phrase,57 but the Internet is in many ways highly 
hierarchical, and increasingly concentrated.58 
The hardware and software infrastructure of the Internet is experiencing 
similar consolidation.  The major players in the Internet economy, including 
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!, are constructing massive central data centers that 
integrate connectivity, applications, and content to deliver increasingly 
sophisticated services across the global Internet.59  To meet the fantastic 
processing and storage demands of today’s network applications, Internet-based 
providers are effectively building virtual supercomputers from thousands of 
coordinated machines.  Constructing this infrastructure requires both significant 
capital and sophisticated expertise in integrating systems.  Internet application 
                                                        
54 Because Microsoft owns the Windows operating system, it controls the application 
programming interfaces that developers use to build software running on Windows-based 
personal computers.  See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 61-62 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (discussing how Microsoft used its control over Windows to harm competition). 
55 Eric Bangeman, 18-month Beatdown:  Google Search Crushing Microsoft, Yahoo, 
ARS TECHNICA, Aug. 13, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080813-18-
month-beatdown-google-search-crushing-microsoft-yahoo.html. 
56 See, e.g., News Release, The Nielson Company, The “500 Million” Club (July 2, 
2008) (http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/report.pdf) 
(demonstrating dominance in U.K.). 
57 See generally THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005) (explaining how globalization creates a “flat” world with a 
level playing field). 
58 See Eli Noam, The Internet:  Still Wide Open and Competitive?, Paper Presented at 
the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference 4 fig.1 (Sept. 2003), available at 
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2003/200/noam_TPRC2003.pdf (finding that 
“the Internet sector’s overall concentration has never been low”). 
59 See generally George Gilder, The Information Factories, WIRED, Oct. 2006, 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.10/cloudware_pr.html (describing how 
Internet creates new centralized “cloud computing” infrastructure in data centers). 
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infrastructure is making the same shift that electric power generation did at the 
end of the nineteenth century.60  Central utilities are replacing local production.61 
The juxtaposition of decentralizing and centralizing forces produces conflicts. 
Powerful new centers threaten other participants, even when they don’t explicitly 
manipulate the terms of their offerings to cement their dominance.  That threat 
in turn, encourages those smaller participants to create their own balkanized 
enclaves.  The very success of the network of networks produces the seeds of its 
failure.62  This basic storyline describes a diverse set of major business, legal, and 
political developments across all segments of the Internet economy.  Part II 
examines four of these fault lines in detail. 
II.  THE PATH TO BALKANIZATION 
For most of its commercial history, the Internet exerted a powerful 
centripetal force.63  The Internet pulled networks together into peering and 
transit relationships,64 linked hundreds of millions of devices into common 
address spaces, established universal application platforms divorced from the 
                                                        
60 See NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH:  REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO 
GOOGLE 12 (2008). 
61 In the 19th  century, companies operated their own local electricity generation 
facilities, typically powered by water wheels.  Large centralized power plants replaced 
these local facilities because they were much more efficient.  The Internet equivalent is 
the shift from individual service or content providers maintaining their own server 
computers to a “cloud computing” model in which massive central data centers provide 
shared capacity for many providers.  See id. at 9-11. 
62 This story is not unique to the Internet.  The tendency of networks to promote both 
centralization and decentralization of power and wealth has been observed in other 
contexts, most notably the sociology of urbanization and globalization.  See Ithiel de sola 
Pool, Communications Technology and Land Use, 451 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
1, 2 (1980); Saskia Sassen, Locating Cities on Global Circuits, 14 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 
13, 15 (2002) (describing “dynamic of simultaneous geographic dispersal and 
concentration”); Kazys Varnelis, The Centripetal City:  Telecommunications, the 
Internet, and the Shaping of the Modern Urban Environment, CABINET MAG., Spring 
2004, available at http://varnelis.net/articles/centripetal_city (explaining how Internet 
produces both centralization and decentralization in urban environment). 
63 See infra Part IV.A.  Because the Internet is a network of networks, it is both the 
origin and the subject of these forces. 
64 See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake:  Connecting Internet Backbones, 11 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 45, 45 (2003). 
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infrastructure underneath, and brought content into accessible pools.65  This 
pressure for uniform connectivity, however, also sowed the seeds of a 
countervailing reaction. 
At every layer of network functionality, the ties that have traditionally bound 
the Internet into a universal, richly connected whole are weakening.66  This Part 
analyzes four major developments:  private address and governance spaces, 
peering archipelagos, proprietary application-integrated broadband networks, 
and islands of protected content.67  While each of these trends has received some 
attention, the pattern behind them has not.  Each phenomenon involves a 
different set of players and a different aspect of the Internet.  Some appear arcane 
and technical, while others seem like typical conflicts between competing 
companies.  The connection, however, is clear.  From the physical infrastructure 
that delivers data across the globe to the content-based services that drive 
advertising and transactions, the Internet is becoming a less uniform, less 
universal place. 
A. Internet Governance:  Operational Balkanization 
The clearest example of creeping Internet fragmentation involves the area 
broadly described as governance — the policies and practices that knit the global 
internetwork together.  The Internet famously has no central government.68  Also, 
because the Internet operates across national boundaries, sovereign nations have 
difficulty subjecting it to their mandates.  The governance of the Internet, in 
practice, involves the arrangements through which systems and sites join the 
network, as well as the policies that individual governments impose on Internet 
                                                        
65 See infra Part II.A-D. 
66 The Internet is a layered system, with separable levels of functionality sitting on top 
of one another.  See Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 57-64 (2002) (describing four vertical layers of internet 
as physical, logical, applications, and content).  See generally Kevin Werbach, Breaking 
the Ice:  Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the Digital Age, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 59 (2005) (expanding on layered model) [hereinafter Werbach, Breaking 
the Ice]. 
67 See infra Part II.A-D. 
68 “We reject:  kings, presidents and voting.  We believe in:  rough consensus and 
running code.”  David D. Clark, An Input/Output Architecture for Virtual Memory 
Computer Systems (Jan. 1, 1974) (Ph.D. dissertation), reprinted in M.I.T. Project MAC 
Technical Report 117, at  (1974), available at 
http://publications.csail.mit.edu/lcs/pubs/pdf/MIT-LCS-TR-117.pdf. 
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providers operating within their jurisdiction.69  In both areas, governments are 
attempting to carve out fiefdoms in which proprietary rules apply. 
This process has been underway for some time.70  The current developments 
however, are different than the traditional governmental efforts to regulate 
Internet activity that affects their citizens or occurs within their borders.  The 
changes to Internet governance mechanisms involve technical alterations to the 
Internet itself.  When an Internet user in France and a Web-based services 
provider headquartered in California are forced to comply with French law, they 
may be prohibited from entering into a transaction, such as sale of Nazi 
memorabilia, that other Internet participants would be free to conduct.71  Yet they 
are still connecting to the same Internet, and benefiting from its universality.  
Thus, there will not be a single Internet if the structure of Internet addressing 
and governance changes. 
The major examples of Internet governance balkanization are fragmentation 
of the address space and governmental efforts to impose localized legal rules.  
This section first describes, in Subpart 1, how Internet addressing operates.  
Subpart 2 then describes the potential breakdown of a unitary address space, 
principally due to battles over international character sets.  Subpart 3 details 
China’s efforts to dominate the future Internet through control over the next-
generation Internet addressing protocol.  Finally, Subpart 4 explains how 
governments are imposing local content rules and other restrictions that further 
fragment the Internet. 
1. Internet Addressing 
The most active battlefield of Internet governance is the domain name system 
(“DNS”).  The DNS is the crucial link between the machine-readable addresses of 
Internet-connected network nodes and their human-readable identities.72  For 
example, a domain name such as “ebay.com” means nothing to the routers that 
                                                        
69 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 31, at 37-40. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. at 1-2. 
72 See generally ELLEN RONY  & PETER RONY, THE DOMAIN NAME HANDBOOK (1998) 
(providing comprehensive and practical history of policies, protocols, principles, 
controversies, and initiatives with DNS); Jon Postel, Network Working Group, RFC 1591:  
Domain Name System Structure and Delegation (Mar. 1994), ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-
notes/rfc1591.txt (providing information on structure of names in DNS and on 
administration of domains). 
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direct Internet traffic but everything to the users looking for the auction site.73  In 
addition to this operational function, the DNS plays a key role in integrating the 
Internet.  The universal DNS database, with generic top-level domain names74 
independent of physical geography, helps to bind the World Wide Web into a 
single global platform.75 
The DNS is a distributed addressing database.76  When a user sends a request 
for an Internet address, such as a web page query or an email message to a 
destination, that user’s Internet service provider (“ISP”) queries its domain name 
server for the Internet Protocol (“IP”) address associated with that name.  The 
ISP’s local domain name server pulls content regularly from one of thirteen 
global “root servers.”  So long as all ISPs point to the canonical root servers, every 
domain name represents a unique point on the Internet.77  However, an ISP could 
choose to point to a different DNS directory.  If an ISP did so, its users might go 
to an entirely different website when they typed an address such as 
Whitehouse.gov or AOL.com.78  Users would have no way of knowing because the 
redirection would be seamless.  Thus, what holds the logical layer of the Internet 
together is the voluntary agreement of ISPs to point to the same root servers. 
The Internet grew out of the NSFNet, managed by the U.S. National Science 
Foundation (“NSF”). The DNS infrastructure in turn was established under an 
NSF contract.79  Network Solutions Inc. (“NSI”), a small networking company, 
                                                        
73 For a description of how the DNS functions, see infra note 76 and accompanying 
text. 
74 A generic top-level domain name (gTLD), such as .com, .biz, or .museum, has no 
necessary connection to a physical location.  By contrast, a country-code domain name, 
such as .uk or .jp, is associated with a sovereign nation.  The most significant gTLDs are 
.com, .net, and .org.  See Postel, supra note 72, at 1-3. 
75 See Christopher Rhoads, Endangered Domain, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2006, at A1 
(explaining how domain name system holds Internet together, and identifying various 
balkanization threats). 
76 Paul Vixie, DNS Complexity, ACM QUEUE, Apr. 2007, at 24, available at 
http://www.acmqueue.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=481&page
=1 (calling DNS “a distributed, coherent, reliable, autonomous, hierarchical database, the 
first and only one of its kind”). 
77 See id. 
78 See RONY & RONY, supra note 72, at 64-75. 
79 See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You — Fool Us Twice 
Shame on Us:  What We Can Learn From the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone 
Network and the Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 170-71 (2001). 
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won the original contract to build and maintain the DNS registry.80  In the mid-
1990s, the NSF allowed NSI to begin charging for domain name registrations, 
migrating the system to a privately funded enterprise.81  An explosion of 
registrations generated capital that allowed for massive expansion of the capacity 
of the DNS.  However, private control of this increasingly important resource was 
tantamount to a government-granted monopoly at the center of the Internet 
infrastructure.82  Meanwhile, pressure grew for the addition of new generic top-
level domain names, such as .com, and conflicts over the intersection of domain 
names and trademarks escalated. 
Subsequently, in 1998 the U.S. government helped create the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) as the administrative 
and policy overseer for the DNS.83  At the same time, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce negotiated a new arrangement with NSI to allow competition in 
domain name registration.84  ICANN is a unique, quasi-private entity.  Formally 
constituted as a California non-profit corporation, it actually operates as a global 
governance entity with a Byzantine structure that incorporates representation 
from various private, non-governmental, and governmental entities.85 
During the reformation of DNS management in the mid-1990s, there were 
serious efforts to set up alternative roots.86  Even Jon Postel, the engineer who 
                                                        
80 See Network Solutions, Company History, http://about-
networksolutions.com/corporate-history.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).  
81 See Answers.com, Network Solutions, LLC, http://www.answers.com/ 
topic/network-solutions (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
82 NSI was eventually acquired by SAIC, a large defense contractor, and subsequently 
by Verisign.  See David Diamond, Whose Internet is it Anyway?, WIRED, Apr. 1998, at 
172; SAIC, Growth of the Company: FY 2000, http://www.saic.com/about/timeline/ 
2000.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2008). 
83 See MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT:  INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING 
OF CYBERSPACE 163 (2002); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace:  Using 
ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 24 (2000); Kesan 
& Shah, supra note 79, at 174; Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of 
Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 209-12 (2000). 
84 See Department of Commerce & Network Solutions, Inc., Amendment No. 11 to 
NCR-09218742, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/ 
docnsi100698.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). 
85 See Froomkin, supra note 83, at 71. 
86 An alternative root is a parallel root server that an Internet access provider can use 
instead of the official root system to determine the Internet protocol address associated 
with a domain name.  See Will A. Foster et al., Who Governs the Internet?, COMM. ACM, 
Aug. 1997, at 15, 19, (discussing concerns about efforts to create “an alternate set of root-
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historically oversaw DNS policy, engaged in a “technical experiment” to redirect 
the root servers, apparently to show that he could.87  The creation of ICANN and 
its arrangements with NSI and other root server operators ended these efforts at 
the time.  There are new scenarios on the horizon, however, under which the 
unity of the DNS may crumble. 
2. Address fragmentation 
One threat to the DNS lies in private address spaces.  The DNS is the 
addressing system for the dominant applications at the dawn of the commercial 
Internet:  email, file transfers, and the Web.  All of these key off of domain 
names.  Many newer applications, however, use their own addresses. The largest 
instant messaging (IM) networks have over 100 million users, reachable through 
names the IM operator assigns privately.88 Skype’s voice over Internet protocol 
(VOIP) service also has over 100 million users.89  Similarly, social networking 
services such as MySpace, Hi5, and Facebook have massive user bases.90  These 
services’ users are not reachable through their universal email address; rather, 
the sender must know their private address on the service. 
Private addresses are nothing new.  IM services have been around since the 
mid-1990s.91  What has changed is the prevalence of these applications and their 
growing share of Internet usage.  This is especially true for younger Internet 
                                                                                                                                                       
level domain name servers”); Weinberg, supra note 83, at 198; Jonathan Zittrain, 
ICANN:  Between the Public and the Private — Comments Before Congress, 14 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1071 n.58 (1999); Open Root Server Confederation, http://www.open-rsc.org/ 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2008); Rogue Domains Revolt, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 4, 1997, 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-275957.html?tag=rn. 
87 See Froomkin, supra note 83, at 46. 
88 See Werbach, Breaking the Ice, supra note 66, at 88. 
89 Edward Cone, Harnessing the Power of Networks, CIO INSIGHT, Aug. 1, 2008, 
available at http://www.cioinsight.com/c/a/Books/Harnessing-the-Power-of-
Networks/. 
90 A social networking service provides information and applications based around a 
“social graph” — a map of relationships between friends or business associates.  See 
Social Networking Increases Across Globe, Facebook Tops Popularity Chart, 
TECHSHOUT, Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.techshout.com/internet/2008/13/social-
networking-increases-across-globe-facebook-tops-popularity-chart/. 
91 The FCC discussed the history and significance of instant messaging in its order 
reviewing the merger of AOL and Time-Warner.  See In Re Applications for Consent to 
the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. 
and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner, Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R. 
6547, 6603 paras. 128-45 (mem. op. & order). 
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users.  There is no sinister plot here.  Application providers are making a 
voluntary decision to create their own addressing schemes, and users are making 
voluntary choices to adopt those applications.  Yet the end result is a movement 
toward fragmentation of the Internet. 
Another, and perhaps more direct, possibility for fragmentation in Internet 
addressing arises from language.  At one level, the language of the Internet is the 
language of its users.  When Americans and other English speakers dominated 
Internet and World Wide Web usage, most of the content online was in English.  
Today, when Europeans and Asians significantly outnumber Americans online, 
content in other languages is an increasingly larger share of the total.92  English 
however, is built into the DNS because the DNS grew out of an American system. 
As evidence that the DNS grew out of an American system, generic top-level 
domain names, for example, are shortened versions of English words: for 
example, .com for commercial, .org for organization, and .net for network.  More 
significantly, the character set used for Internet addresses is ASCII, a standard 
designed for English and other languages based on the Roman alphabet.93  An 
address in Arabic or Russian, to say nothing of idiographic languages such as 
Mandarin and Japanese, must be transliterated into ASCII.94  An Internet user 
speaking one of these languages cannot simply type in or read a website address 
as an English or French speaker can because they use a different character set 
than the network. 
The way to overcome this limitation is to adopt mechanisms in the DNS that 
accept Unicode, a broader standard than ASCII, which can support the world’s 
main languages.95  Unfortunately, implementation of such internationalized 
domain names (“IDNs”) is not simple, and there are several different options for 
doing so.  For example, IDNs must co-exist with the existing ASCII domain 
names.  This means that some ASCII names that overlap with common Unicode 
                                                        
92 See Future of Non-English Internet, DIGITAL LEARNING MAG., Feb., 2008, at 33, 
available at http://www.digitallearning.in/articles/article-details.asp?articleid=1718&typ 
=THE%20FOYER. 
93 ASCII has more characters than English, but many fewer than would be necessary 
for all the world’s major languages. Geoff Huston, Internationalizing the Internet, ISP 
COLUMN, Dec. 2006, http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/ 2006-12/idn.html. 
94 Hence, for example, one of the largest free web-based email services in China is 
163.net, because 163 can be transliterated into “free” in Mandarin. <CITE> 
95 See THE UNICODE CONSORTIUM, THE UNICODE STANDARD:  WORLDWIDE CHARACTER 
ENCODING, VERSION 1.0, at 1 (1991). 
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strings96 in some languages will take users to unexpected places.  A Korean 
speaker might see one site after typing in a domain name, while a German 
speaker would see an entirely different site after typing in the Roman character 
equivalent of the same domain name.  Effectively this would mean that different 
languages would create their own parallel domain name systems.97  There might 
still be a single governance regime, but to users the result would be identical to a 
situation in which each character set had its own parallel root servers. 
ICANN has been working to implement IDNs for several years.  However, 
progress towards an agreement has been slow, dissatisfying representatives of 
many countries.98  Ineffective implementation of ICANN-approved IDNs could 
have significant negative consequences for the Internet, and could actually lead 
to the balkanization that the changes are supposed to avert.  In particular, 
countries could adopt their own IDNs without waiting for ICANN.99  When the 
governments pressured ICANN to implement IDNs quickly, ICANN chair Paul 
Twomey expressed concern: “The Internet is like a fifteen story building, and 
with international domain names what we’re trying to do is change the bricks in 
the basement . . . . [W]e have to make sure that if we change the system, the rest 
is all going to work.”100 
                                                        
96 A string is an arbitrary series of characters. 
97 See Geoff Huston, Addressing the Future of the Internet, ISP COLUMN, Feb. 2007, 
http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2007-02/address-paper.html; Huston, supra note 93. 
98 Michael Geist, China and the Break-Up of the Net, BBC NEWS.COM, Mar. 7, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4779660.stm. 
99 See Carolyn Duffy Marsan, Native Language Domains Threaten ’Net, NETWORK 
WORLD, Mar. 27, 2006, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2006/032706-icann-
internationalized-domain-names.html (“The issue of IDNs threatens to undermine the 
Internet itself, which is based on a shared namespace that originates in a single root.”); 
Dugie Standeford, ICANN Urged to Speed Up IDNs to Prevent Dangerous “Breakaway” 
TLDs, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Mar. 29, 2006.. There have also been efforts to use 
alternate private naming systems on top of the DNS.  See Leslie Walker, Web Shortcuts 
Become Key Issue, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2000, at E1; James Niccolai, Dutch Company 
Starts New Internet Address System, INFOWORLD, Nov. 28, 2005, 
http://www.infoworld.com/archives/emailPrint.jsp?R=printThis&A=/article/05/11/28/
HNnewaddresssystem_1.html. 
100 Asher Moses, Web Chief Warns of Domain Name Chaos, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD, Nov. 21, 2006, http://www.smh.com.au/news/web/web-chief-warns-of-
domain-name-chaos/2006/11/21/1163871392720.html. 
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A 2006 report that China was creating its own parallel root system proved to 
be a misunderstanding.101  The report however, could easily have been accurate.  
ICANN began implementing IDNs in early 2008 even though open policy 
questions persisted.102  Operators of some top-level domains are not waiting.  
Neustar, the ICANN-approved registry for the .biz generic top-level domain 
name, launched IDNs in March 2007.103  Although such initiatives do not 
necessarily conflict with ICANN’s efforts, they raise the possibility of different 
portions of the DNS having different internationalization patterns.  Multiple 
inconsistent implementations of IDNs could turn into a form of fragmentation, or 
at least segmentation, of the Net. 
Alphanumeric domain names are not the only Internet addresses at risk of 
fragmentation.  A similar threat is arising around IP numbers, the unique 
numeric addresses that routers use to identify each machine connected to the 
Internet. 
3. China’s IPv6 strategy 
When the current version of the Internet protocol, IPv4, was defined in 1979, 
the Internet was still a noncommercial network for a relatively small number of 
research and government computers.104  The Internet’s protocol designers 
adopted a 32-bit address space, allowing for roughly four billion unique network 
hosts.  At the time, that seemed like a nearly inexhaustible number.105 
As the Internet grew, however, the address space gradually became 
congested.  Because addresses are hierarchical and assigned in blocks to 
                                                        
101 See BR Staff Writer, China Splits from the Internet?  Probably Not, COMPUTER 
BUS. REV., Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.cbronline.com/comment/china_splits_from_the_ 
internet_probably_not. 
102 See Press Release, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Numbers, IDN TLD 
Allocation Implementation Processes (Aug. 20, 2008) (http://www.icann.org/en/ 
announcements/announcement-20aug08-en.htm); Larry Seltzer, The Era of Whatever, 
EWEEK.COM, June 26, 2008, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/The-Era-of-
Whatever/. 
103 See Press Release, NeuStar, Inc., NeuStar Launches Chinese and Japanese 
Language Domain Names in .BIZ TLD (Mar. 22, 2007) (http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=189420&p=irol-newsArticle_print&ID=977185&highlight=). 
104 See Information Sciences Institute, Internet Protocol (Aug. 1979), 
http://www.networksorcery.com/enp/ien/ien111.txt. 
105 See id. 
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networks, not every available address is available for use.106  Massive blocks of 
addresses were assigned early on to networks and organizations that did not 
actually need them.  Moreover, the Internet no longer just connected personal 
computers, but also incorporated mobile phones, sensors, and other devices.107  
Growing Internet adoption has accelerated the time horizon before all available 
IPv4 addresses are distributed.  Although various measures have been taken to 
reduce the usage of IP addresses, current estimates are that IPv4 addresses will 
be exhausted in 2011 or 2012.108 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”), which defines Internet 
standards, responded to the impending addressing shortage, and to other 
limitations in IPv4 such as security, by developing a new protocol, IPv6.109  IPv6 
was adopted in 1995 as the official replacement for IPv4.110  IPv6 provides 128-bit 
address space, enough for more than 1038 unique hosts — more than the total 
number of atoms on the surface of the planet.111 
Despite the advantages of IPv6, adoption over the past decade has been 
spotty.  The costs of updating every network-connected device are substantial.112  
Companies and network operators see no revenue gains associated with these 
costs because from the outside the network operates the same as it did before.  
Furthermore, the IETF has no authority to mandate protocol adoption.  
                                                        
106 See William Jackson, Government Moves to IPv6 One Step at a Time, GOV’T 
COMPUTER NEWS, Dec. 11, 2000, http://www.gcn.com/print/vol19_no34/3391-1.html 
(stating that IPv4 address allocation is only five percent efficient). 
107 See Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321, 2324 
(2007). 
108 See Dugie Standeford, Enhanced Cooperation in Key Policy Areas Said to Show 
ICANN Works, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, July 2, 2007, at <PIN> (quoting ICANN 
Chairman Vint Cerf’s estimate of IPv4 exhaustion date); Neal Weinberg, D-Day Is 
Coming Up Fast, NETWORK WORLD, June 28, 2007, 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/062807-ipv6-deadline.html (stating ARIN 
head John Curran’s estimate of  2011 exhaustion date). 
109 S. Deering et al., Network Working Group, Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) 
Specification (Dec. 1998), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2460.txt; IPv6:  The Next 
Generation!, Information Page, http://www.ipv6.org/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). 
110 Ben Worthen, Internet Strategy:  China’s Next Generation Internet, CIO MAG., 
July 15, 2006, www.cio.com/article/22985. 
111 Kevin Murphy, Internet Addresses Drying Up Fast, COMPUTERWIRE, May 22, 
2007, www.computerwire.com/industries/research/?pid=8508BA51-4FCC-47E9-AEE7-
FAAFF18AC8F1. 
112 See Weinberg, supra note 108. 
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Assuming a private group or regulator could somehow require a transition and 
shut off IPv4-based equipment, such a step would produce massive disruption 
and outcry.  So, while software and hardware sold today almost universally 
supports IPv6 as an option, few major networks are fully updated to IPv6.113  As a 
result, IPv4 address exhaustion is a real possibility.114 
The shortage of IPv4 addresses is felt most acutely in China, which had 
negligible Internet usage a decade ago, but is experiencing massive growth in 
connectivity.  More than a quarter of all worldwide IPv4 addresses are assigned 
in the United States even though it represents a significantly smaller share of the 
global Internet user base.115  In fact, even though China now has as many Internet 
users as the United States, it controls only about sixty million IP addresses, the 
same as Stanford University.116 
China’s national government seized on the Internet as an important priority 
for technological leadership in the twenty-first century.  As a result, China has 
been aggressively funding development of the Chinese Internet industry.  China 
has made IPv6 deployment a centerpiece of this national Internet policy.117  It is 
                                                        
113 For example, both Microsoft and Apple’s current operating systems natively 
support IPv6.  
114 See Ben Arnoldy, For Online Users, a Looming Shortage of IP Addresses, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 3, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0803/p02s01-
ussc.html?page=2; IPv4 Address Report, http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/index.html 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2008).  ARIN, which assigns IP addresses for North America, felt the 
need to issue its August 1 statement to express its opposition to efforts that have already 
begun to create a secondary market for increasingly scarce IPv4 addresses.  Statement of 
ARIN’s Board of Trustees Regarding Future Internet Address Policy in the ARIN Region 1 
(Aug. 1, 2007) (http://www.arin.net/media/200701August_Statement.pdf); see also 
Posting of John Curran to NANOG Mailing List, http://www.merit.edu/mail. 
archives/nanog/msg01712.html (July 24, 2007) (“Continuation of the ISP industry is 
predicated on enabling IPv6 for public-facing sites over the next few years.”).  See 
generally Raymond A. Plzak & Stephen M. Ryan, Legal and Policy Aspects of Internet 
Number Resources, Presented to VI Computer Law World Conference (Sept. 6, 2006), 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/complaw/docs/ARIN.pdf (explaining “the need for a 
consistent legal and public policy approach to critical management issues regarding 
‘internet number resources,’ which include Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses”). 
115 See NO. RESOURCE ORG., INTERNET NUMBER RESOURCE REPORT, http://www.nro. 
net/documents/presentations/jointstats.v1.0608.pdf (citing to IPv4 Global Unicast 
Address Assignments, http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space/) (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
116 See Worthen, supra note 110. 
117 See David Kirkpatrick, Experts Say U.S. Must Act on Internet, FORTUNE, Nov. 6, 
2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/03/technology/fastforward_ipv6 
_networking.fortune;  Robert Cringely, The $200 Billion Lunch:  We’re Switching to 
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building China’s Next Generation Internet, an all-IPv6 high-speed Internet 
platform.118  The Chinese government has already invested $200 million directly 
in the effort, supplemented with indirect expenditures by telecommunications 
companies and research organizations.119 
By allowing every network-connected device to have its own address, IPv6 
could facilitate a new generation of Internet-based applications, especially those 
involving smart devices beyond the personal computer.  China also linked IPv6 
deployment to its hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games.120  China is betting that, 
by leading the world in IPv6 deployment, it will gain a head start on development 
of the new applications and services that take advantage of IPv6.  China believes 
this process will be analogous to the way the United States had a significant head 
start in building the applications that define today’s Internet.121 
IPv6 itself is a non-proprietary standard issued by the IETF.122  However, 
there would be many opportunities for a country that dominated implementation 
of IPv6 to dictate standards and practical implementation of services.  Companies 
will build products to meet market demand.  If the Chinese implementation of 
IPv6 represents the biggest market, vendors will make equipment to support it. 
The world got a taste of what this scenario could look like with the 
development of new mobile phone standards when China developed its own 
proprietary protocol, called TD-SCDMA.123  Vendors had to decide whether to 
develop products to the proprietary Chinese standard, even though it may not 
have been efficient to do so.  A 2006 survey of 1,000 Internet experts by network 
equipment manufacturer Juniper Networks found that eighty-six percent of 
respondents worried that slow adoption of IPv6 would hurt U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                       
IPv6, Dontcha Know, and It Might Be Worth It, THE PULPIT, Nov. 2, 2006, 
http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/2006/pulpit_20061102_001174.html. 
118 See Worthen, supra note 110. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See sources cited supra note 109. 
123 TD-SCDMA stands for time division synchronous code division multiple access.  It 
is a variant of the code division multiple access (CDMA) technologies in other third- 
generation wireless standards. See Frederick Yeung, Beijing Has Much at Stake on 3G 
Plan, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 7, 2008, at 5. 
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competitiveness.124  More worrisome, fifty-eight percent thought it could imperil 
the stability of the Internet in the United States.125 
 Damage to U.S. competitiveness is only one dimension of the threat from 
aggressive Chinese implementation of IPv6.  A world in which some countries 
build on IPv6, while others continue to maintain IPv4 networks, is one in which 
the address space of the Net is no longer universal.  Management issues across 
the boundaries of these two blocks may become more complex, especially if they 
divide along geopolitical boundaries.  Investment in enhancements on one 
platform may not redound to the full benefit of the other if those enhancements 
either depend on or work around the local addressing environment. 
As significant as these technical and market challenges are, they are not the 
only danger of Internet fragmentation arising from the addressing system.  
Control over Internet addressing is also a political question. 
4. The politics of balkanization 
The DNS and its associated components are the closest things the Internet 
has to central control points.  Shut down any website, or even any Internet 
backbone network, and while there might be significant disruption, the Internet 
as we know it would continue to function.126  Shut down the DNS root servers, 
and the Internet would effectively go dark.127  Moreover, the DNS is also the 
mechanism by which individuals, organizations, and networks take concrete, 
public steps to join the Internet.  A user can connect to the Internet simply by 
opening a private account with any access provider.  However, a website seeking 
to become publicly accessible must register its domain name somewhere so that 
it goes into the central registry and root servers.128  The DNS therefore is the 
logical place to locate any regulatory or contractual obligations on Internet sites. 
                                                        
124 See Press Release, Juniper Networks, IPv6 Transition Will Impact 30 Percent of 
U.S. Government IT Purchasing Decisions in 2007 According to IPv6 Government Action 
Study (Nov. 6, 2006) (http://www.juniper.net/company/presscenter/pr/2006/pr-
061106.html). 
125 See id. 
126 Because each Internet router independently forwards packets along the best route 
to its destination, traffic is automatically routed along new paths when one network fails. 
127 More precisely, there would be no updates, since ISPs would still have the static 
links in their cached copies of DNS. 
128 See MUELLER, supra note 83, at 5-7. 
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Many governments chafe at what they perceive to be the excessive level of 
U.S. dominance of the Internet.  Their concerns include dissatisfaction with 
ICANN, a belief that Internet governance issues should be addressed through an 
established international organization such as the United Nations, and the desire 
of developing countries to address the global digital divide.129 
These concerns coalesced in an U.N. effort called the World Summit on 
Information Society (“WSIS”).130  In 2003 and 2005, WSIS held two meetings to 
address key issues of global Internet governance.  Throughout the process, the 
United States, while endorsing the broad concept of the meeting, strongly 
resisted pressure to turn over ICANN’s governance function to an international 
body.  After a great deal of debate, representatives at the second WSIS meeting 
agreed to create a new group to carry forward its work — the Internet Governance 
Forum (“IGF”).131  At the time, U.S. representatives expressed satisfaction that 
the IGF was a discussion forum rather than an agency with any power to adopt 
rules, and would not supersede the existing authority vested in ICANN.132 
It remains to be seen whether the IGF will satisfy both the forces for and 
against an intergovernmental Internet governance mechanism.  If the IGF fails, 
countries may simply go their own way, balkanizing the Internet.133  Such 
balkanization would not necessarily involve a series of completely parallel 
networks.  Recall that the DNS functions through the voluntary decisions of ISPs 
to point to the canonical root servers.  If operators in some countries chose to 
point to non-ICANN root servers, these databases may be almost completely 
identical to the current ones, at least initially.  Users would therefore not see 
anything different until the breakaway network began to adopt different DNS 
                                                        
129 See Joan Engebretson, Rooted in Controversy, TELEPHONY, Nov. 20, 2006, at 28, 
31, available at http://telephonyonline.com/mag/telecom_rooted_controversy/ 
index.html; Jonathan Krim, U.S. May Face World at Internet Governance Summit, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2005, at D05; Frederick Kempe, How the Web Was Run, WALL ST. 
J. ONLINE, Oct. 25, 2005, available at http://www.wgig.org/news/Thinking%20Global 
.pdf.  The issues didn’t involve the war, but the climate made more desire for 
international solutions. 
130 See World Summit on the Information Society, Basic Information:  About WSIS, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/basic/about.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008). 
131 See Internet Governance Forum, About This Web Site, 
http://www.intgovforum.org/about.htm  (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
132 See Declan McCullagh, US Endorses Internet Governance Forum, ZDNET, Nov. 
16, 2005, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/0,1000000097,39237279,00.htm. 
133 See Darren Waters, Warning Over “Broken Up” Internet, BBC NEWS, Oct. 12, 
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6037345.stm. 
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mappings.  Recently, a group based in Germany, calling itself the Open Root 
Server Network, established its own parallel root system to protest the U.S. 
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.134  Though largely symbolic, this effort shows 
how simple it would be to split the Internet.  If the concerns that gave rise to the 
WSIS meeting are not resolved in the coming years, there may be more serious 
efforts, backed by governments from around the globe, to set up a parallel root 
system. 
Already, those countries wishing to control what Internet content their 
citizens can access, most notably China, are taking matters into their own hands 
and creating a semi-balkanized Internet.  China has created a ring of gateways at 
the points where Internet backbones pass into the country, deploying filtering 
servers that block or redirect certain content deemed politically or otherwise 
inappropriate.  This “Great Firewall of China” can be circumvented by clever 
technical mechanisms, but the average Chinese Web user sees what the 
government deems appropriate.135 
China is the most prominent, but by no means the only, country adopting 
pervasive Internet censorship.  In fact, Internet censorship is proliferating 
around the world.136  Governments seeking fine-grained controls on what speech 
passes across the network may find common ground with network operators 
seeking fine-grained control over applications and content as a way of enhancing 
revenues.  These governments may also make common cause with individuals 
seeking to exclude malware and what they perceive to be inappropriate.137 
                                                        
134 See Foroohar, supra note 1, at 39. 
135 See Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech On The Internet:  A Legal and 
Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REV. 395, 396 (1999); Christopher Stevenson, Note,  
Breaching the Great Firewall:  China’s Internet Censorship and the Quest for Freedom 
of Expression in a Connected World, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 531, 556-57 (2007); 
Germie Barme & Sang Ye, The Great Firewall of China, WIRED, June 1997, at 176. 
136 See Mark Anderson, A Sneak Peek at a Fractured Web, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 13, 
2006, http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/11/72104.  See generally 
ACCESS DENIED:  THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 155-432 
(Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2007) (analyzing Internet filtering practices in over three 
dozen countries); Nart Villeneuve, The Filtering Matrix:  Integrated Mechanisms of 
Information Control and the Demarcation of Borders in Cyberspace, FIRST MONDAY, 
May 1996, at 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1307/1227 
(“Increasingly, states are adopting practices aimed at regulating and controlling the 
Internet as it passes through their borders.”)(Last visited Nov. 19, 2008). 
137 See John G. Palfrey, Jr. & Robert Rogoyski, The Move to the Middle:  The 
Enduring Threat of “Harmful” Speech to Network Neutrality, 21 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 31, 
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As a legal matter, governments are entitled to determine what Internet 
content their citizens can access, just as they can determine what books they read 
or what television shows they can view.138  The thorny disputes over Internet 
jurisdiction involve situations where one country seeks to apply its laws to 
individuals or companies located somewhere else.139  There is no question today 
that governments have the technical wherewithal to, at a minimum, make it 
significantly more difficult for their citizens to access information on the 
Internet.140  The danger lies in Internet content controls becoming not just local 
actions on the part of individual governments, but challenges to the structure and 
universality of the Internet itself.  Those challenges are even more apparent in the 
next area of potential fragmentation: the physical infrastructure that carries 
network traffic. 
B. Network Infrastructure:  Service Balkanization 
The physical networks that deliver Internet data across the world are also 
susceptible to balkanization.  These “backbone” networks were the initial 
adopters of the interconnectivity that produced the composite Internet.141  In fact, 
the primary function of the Internet protocol is to enable independent data 
networks to federate into a single meta-network.  Today, however, the primary 
considerations for the Internet’s constituent networks are not technical, but 
economic.  The business relationships between Internet backbone networks 
determine the basic connectivity patterns of the network.  As with addressing and 
governance, fragmentation is beginning to replace universality.  Subpart 1 of this 
section explains how Internet backbone interconnection operates, and Subpart 2 
explains how the system that allowed for relatively seamless connectivity is 
breaking down. 
                                                                                                                                                       
42-53 (2006); Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 
2013 (2006). 
138 This is not a judgment that censorship is good. It most certainly is not. But it 
exists. 
139 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 31, at 143-45; Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology 
and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1953 (2005). 
140 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 31, at 66-85. 
141 An Internet service provider (ISP) or Internet access provider, such as Earthlink or 
Time Warner Cable, offers service directly to an end-user or company.  A backbone 
provider, such as Level 3 Communications, offers service between ISPs.  Some companies 
such as Verizon and AT&T provide both functions.  See Werbach, supra note 42, at 13. 
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1. Terms of network interconnection 
Until the early 1990s, there was only one Internet backbone — the NSFNet, 
operated by the National Science Foundation.142  Regional educational and 
governmental networks connected through this backbone to hand off traffic.  
When the NSF decided to exit from the business of managing the Internet, it did 
not simply privatize the central NSFNet.  Instead, the NSF decreed that, at the 
same time the Internet was commercialized, the backbone would become 
competitive.143  To this aim, the NSF funded the creation of Network Access 
Points (NAPs) for exchange of traffic and required the privatized NSFNet 
backbone to connect to them.144  At these neutral, multi-lateral exchange points, 
new backbones could interconnect to exchange traffic without restriction. 
Within a few years, the NAPs became congested and diminished in 
significance relative to a new set of private inter-backbone relationships and 
third-party interconnection mechanisms.145  The contractual relationships 
between backbones took two primary forms: peering and transit.146  In a peering 
relationship, the networks exchange traffic without any financial settlement.  The 
assumption is that the networks gain roughly equal benefits from the 
relationship, and therefore metering and billing for traffic passing in each 
direction merely adds complexity and transaction costs to the relationship.147  
Conversely, in a transit relationship, one network pays the other for the service of 
delivering packets.148 
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has never attempted to 
regulate the financial relationships between the networks that make up the 
Internet.149 Thus, there is no standard rule for which inter-network relationships 
are subject to peering and which to transit.  Nor is there any standard definition 
                                                        
142 See id. 
143 See Brett M. Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet 
Infrastructure:  Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Government 
Intervention into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 19-24 (2001); Kesan & 
Shaw, supra note 79, at 111-16. 
144 See Kesan & Shah, supra note 79, at 169-70. 
145 See Werbach, supra note 2, at 1252-53. 
146 Kende, supra note 64, at 45. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 See Werbach, supra note 2, at 1255. 
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of what pricing arrangement applies when the parties agree to a positive charge 
in a transit situation. 
Backbone interconnection is an economic decision.  Networks handing off 
traffic to each other have customers that benefit from the exchange.  However, 
the relative benefits and costs of the exchange to each network may vary 
depending on the circumstances.150  Customers of a small network gain more 
from reaching a big network, for example.  Therefore, the economically efficient 
pricing regime may involve a positive charge from one network to the other.  
Moreover, many network interconnection situations involve a “build vs. buy” 
decision.  Peering requires each network to construct infrastructure to a common 
point or points.151  Transit is a service that networks can purchase from others.  
Each network must weigh the relative benefits of extending its own infrastructure 
to carry the traffic in question to its destination, versus relying on another 
network to do so.152 
By distinguishing peering from transit, while treating the boundary line as an 
evolving negotiation between market participants and allowing significant 
flexibility in transit pricing arrangement, the Internet economic model optimally 
addresses the full range of networks.  By allowing any network of sufficient size 
and scope to become a top-tier “peer” with others, and still allowing smaller 
networks to reap the benefits of ubiquitous connectivity, these economic 
arrangements helped facilitate all the innovation that took place on top of the 
infrastructure.  Nonetheless, the peering system is under strain, as the next 
subpart explains. 
2. Fearing for peering 
Disputes have flared up many times between networks that disagree about 
whether both parties are entitled to free traffic exchange.153  The most visible  
                                                        
150 See Adam Candeub, Network Interconnection and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
369, 404-09 (2004). 
151 This is inherent in the nature of peering.  If each party were not responsible for 
constructing infrastructure to the meet point, one network would have to pay the other to 
do so. 
152 See Candeub, supra note 150, at 404-09. 
153 See, e.g., Kesan & Shah, supra note 79, at 112-13 (identifying difficulties in the 
backbone market); Jonathan Angel, Toll Lanes on the Information Superhighway, 
NETWORK, Feb. 1, 2000, at 27 (describing conflicts between Internet backbones); Denise 
Pappalardo, When Private Peering Arrangements Go Bad, NETWORK WORLD, June 11, 
2001, at 8 (discussing failures of private peering arrangements); Neil Weinberg, 
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peering dispute occurred in 2005 between backbone operators Cogent and Level 
3.154  Level 3 terminated its then-existing peering agreement with Cogent.  Level 3 
argued that because Cogent originated significantly more traffic than it received, 
the relationship was more expensive for Level 3.  Because Level 3 terminated 
more of the traffic, it had to invest more in its own infrastructure. Therefore, 
Level 3 claimed, Cogent was more appropriately classified as a paying transit 
customer.155  Cogent insisted that it should still be entitled to settlement-free 
peering with Level 3.  When negotiations failed, Level 3 severed the links between 
the two networks.  This caused connectivity outages for customers of both 
networks.156  Eventually, amid threads of government intervention, Level 3 re-
established the link.  The companies ultimately negotiated an agreement, 
although its terms were confidential.157 
The Cogent-Level 3 dispute was an isolated occurrence affecting a small 
subset of Internet users.158  Changes in the backbone market, however, could 
break down the traditional peering equilibrium.  The centripetal dynamics at the 
physical layer of the Internet operate effectively because there has been no truly 
                                                                                                                                                       
Backbone Bullies, FORBES, June 12, 2000, at 236 (describing the exercise of market power 
by backbones); see also Joan Engebretson, Level 3:  Whiner or Visionary, TELEPHONY, 
May 25, 1998, at 7 (describing MCI-WorldCom’s refusal to peer with Level 3); John J. 
Keller, Level 3 Assails the WorldCom-MCI Deal, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1998, at B10. 
154 See Stacy Cowley, Level 3, Cogent Call Time Out on Peering Spat, IDG NEWS 
SERVICE, Oct. 10, 2005, http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/10/10/HNlevel3cogent 
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155 See Level 3 Issues Statement Concerning Internet Peering and Cogent 
Communications, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 7, 2005, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-
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157 See Cowley, supra note 154. 
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negotiations and contractual terms are almost always confidential, few examples are 
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dominant backbone.159  However, the possibilities for new arrangements are 
more acute today.160 
Consider one such scenario.  AT&T and Verizon are the dominant Internet 
backbones.  They are among the largest backbones in terms of traffic and 
geographic coverage.  More importantly, they are the only large backbones to also 
control last-mile connectivity161 in significant parts of the country, and to have 
large numbers of retail broadband subscribers.  Verizon and AT&T might 
establish a peering relationship with one another and refuse to offer such peering 
to other backbones.  The cable industry is poised to do something similar for its 
VOIP services.162 
Such a move by Verizon and AT&T would likely push other major backbones, 
such as Level 3 and Qwest, to partner or be acquired by competitors of the two 
dominant backbones.  For example, Comcast already has an arrangement with 
Level 3 to lease significant quantities of dark fiber, which provides additional 
capacity that can be “lit” at a later date.  Comcast individually, or the major cable 
operators collectively, or the cable operators and Sprint Nextel, which are in an 
alliance for wireless broadband, could purchase one or more of these major 
backbones.  Google and Microsoft, both of which have grand ambitions and vast 
assets through their market capitalization, would also be in the mix as potential 
acquirers. 
If such a scenario came to pass, the Internet backbone could evolve away 
from the current uneven but relatively stable market structure, in which large 
backbones have an advantage over smaller players but where universal 
connectivity is preserved through market forces.163  The new backbone ecosystem 
                                                        
159 The equilibrium of many competitive backbones avoids the network effects 
problem that allows one network to dominate.  See infra Part IV.B. 
160 See Robert Frieden, Without Public Peer:  The Potential Regulatory and 
Universal Service Consequences of Internet Balkanization, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 30-34 
(1998). 
161 The last mile is the final run of network wiring (or wireless signal) from a network 
operator’s office to a house or business.   
162 See Carol Wilson, VON:  Cable Close to National VOIP Peering, TELEPHONY 
ONLINE, May 21, 2007, http://telephonyonline.com/voip/technology/cable_voip_ 
peering_032107/. 
163 In reviewing the market structure of the backbone in connection with Verizon’s 
acquisition of MCI, the FCC concluded that, “[s]o long as there is ‘rough equality’ among 
backbone providers, each has an incentive to peer with the others to provide universal 
connectivity to the Internet.” See In re Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc. 
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would be dominated by, in all likelihood, two to three independent “archipelagos” 
involving a combination of backbone, last-mile, and content/information service 
assets. 
In contrast to the status quo, these archipelagos probably would not provide 
seamless connectivity to one another.  Especially if information service, content 
providers, or both, were in the ownership mix, backbones would look for ways to 
provide preferential transport to their partners.  A Verizon DSL customer would, 
in all likelihood, still be able to reach Google’s website because customers would 
demand such access and regulators would probably mandate it.  However, the 
quality of access, and the menu of offerings available to customers, would vary 
depending on their choice of access provider.  The environment would look 
similar to the online services ecosystem in the late 1980s, just prior to the 
explosion of the commercial Internet.164  The archipelagos would provide 
interconnectivity for established applications where it was expected, such as 
email, but would vie to use exclusivity or price/product discrimination for new 
services, content, and applications. 
Concern over Internet backbones failing to peer with one another, resulting in 
a balkanized Internet, is not unprecedented.  In the early days of the commercial 
Internet, when the UUNet backbone achieved a degree of market power, it set 
about trying to pressure other backbones into less advantageous interconnection 
agreements.165  In the late 1990s, there were significant disputes about peering 
policies, which led to predictions than the Internet would fragment.166  In various 
FCC and Department of Justice merger review proceedings at the time, 
competitiveness of the backbone was a major issue.  Sprint and WorldCom 
abandoned their proposed merger largely because the Department of Justice 
announced its intention to block the combination for promoting excessive 
consolidation of the Internet backbone.167 
The difference today is that the largest backbones are also the dominant 
access providers.  They have the ability to leverage their monopoly control over 
                                                                                                                                                       
Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, 20 F.C.C.R. 18433, 18496 para. 118 
(2005) (mem. op. & order). 
164 For example, email was not fully interoperable among online services such as 
Compuserve and Prodigy for some time.  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
165 See Frieden, supra note 160, at 10 n.15; Kende, supra note 64, at 47-48. 
166 See sources cited supra note 165. 
167 See Complaint at 9-11, United States v. WorldCom, No. 00-CV-1526 (D.D.C. June 
26, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f5000/5051.pdf. 
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the “last mile” to a particular user into the more competitive backbone market. 
Moreover, they are major providers of voice and video services that Internet-
based alternatives such as Skype and YouTube might threaten.  Even if no player 
has market power in the backbone market itself, incentives to preserve peering, 
and the broader linkage it promotes across the physical layer, are diminishing. 
Recently, another threat to backbone interconnectivity has emerged in the 
form of patents on methods to interconnect VOIP services with the public 
telephone networks.  Several companies, beginning with Verizon, successfully 
sued Vonage, the leading independent, equipment-based VOIP provider, for 
infringing on VOIP interconnection patents.168  The bulk of the patents were for 
interconnection techniques.169  The possibility that interconnection on the 
Internet will no longer be a matter of technical sufficiency and business 
agreement, but rather require negotiation with a group of intellectual property 
right-holders, adds a frightening new dimension to the backbone balkanization 
equation.  With voice traffic increasingly migrating to VOIP, even for incumbent 
operators, the patent overhang becomes substantial.  Controversial suits against 
Microsoft, Research in Motion, and eBay have illustrated the extreme confusion 
and disruption that patent litigation can generate.170  When the patent is the 
means for interconnecting participants in the network, the threat is even more 
severe. 
The foundations of the universal interconnected Internet are thus not as 
stable as they may seem.  The same pattern is emerging at higher levels of 
functionality.  Above the physical layer of network backbones and the logical 
layer of addressing are the applications such as the World Wide Web and email 
that users interact with directly.  These are subject to their own balkanizing 
forces, in the form of efforts to violate the application neutrality of the network. 
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C. Network Neutrality and Application Balkanization 
A core design feature of the Internet is that it is not limited to providing a 
particular application or class of application. In the words of renowned Internet 
engineer David Clark, it is “oblivious” to the uses of the network.171  Any service 
that can be encapsulated into the TCP/IP protocol stack can be delivered over the 
network.172  This makes the Internet very different from platforms, such as the 
public switched telephone network, which are highly optimized for one kind of 
service.173  The telephone network does an excellent job of delivering reliable, 
good-quality voice phone calls, but its suitability for other applications is limited.  
The Internet promotes innovation because the network itself is not optimized for 
one service and is flexible enough to support unanticipated applications.174  
Because the Internet knows nothing about applications, it can serve as a universal 
platform to connect all of them. 
Today, the Internet’s indifference to applications is breaking down.  Retail 
broadband access in the United States is largely a duopoly, with major cable and 
telephone companies dominating the market.175  Two companies — AT&T and 
Verizon — control the lion’s share of the nationwide DSL access market; a small 
number of cable operators, led by Comcast and Time Warner, are their primary 
competitors.176  Further, the FCC classified both DSL and cable modem access as 
                                                        
      171 DAVID CLARK ET AL., NEW ARCH:  FUTURE GENERATION INTERNET ARCHITECTURE 22 
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FAILURE AND A POLICY DILEMMA 132 (2004); Rob Pegoraro, Broadband Is Too Important 
to Be Left to Cable-Phone Duopoly, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2005, at F07. 
176 A few independent providers such as Earthlink remain active, but their share of 
the market is small, and they depend on reselling incumbent services.  
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“information services,” meaning that network operators are not subject to 
requirements that they share their networks with competitors.177 
In this environment, incumbent broadband providers could discriminate 
against unaffiliated providers of Internet applications and content.178  Advocates 
of “network neutrality” urge the government to adopt rules prohibiting network 
operators from engaging in such discrimination.179  These advocates argue that, 
without enforceable network neutrality mandates, the network owners will 
dampen innovation in the application and content markets.180  The operators and 
their supporters respond that they have no incentive to engage in such practices 
and that neutrality mandates would constrain their own incentives to innovate 
and deploy new broadband services.181 
There is an unappreciated danger in the fight.  A non-neutral Internet is also 
a non-uniform Internet.  If network operators begin cutting special deals with 
content and application providers, the capabilities a user enjoys will increasingly 
depend on which access provider they use.  Baseline Internet connectivity will 
still be universally available, but users will be choosing a set of capabilities tied to 
their access mechanism. 
In opposition to network neutrality mandates, Christopher Yoo argues that 
there is a choice between promoting network neutrality and what he calls 
network diversity — an environment in which networks make different choices 
                                                        
177 See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and 
Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4819 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed 
rulemaking) (concerning cable modem service); In re Appropriate Framework for 
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3019 (2002) 
(notice of proposed rulemaking) (concerning DSL service); Werbach, supra note 2, at 
1268. 
178 See sources cited supra note 2. 
179 See Petitioner for Declaratory Ruling at 3, In re the Petition of Free Press et al. for 
Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s Internet 
Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for ‘Reasonable Network 
Management,’ No. 07-52 (FCC Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov 
/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?Native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6519810275; Wu, Network 
Neutrality, supra note 2, at 8; Ex Parte Submission in CS Docket No. 02-52 from 
Timothy Wu, Professor of Law, Univ. of Va., and Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, 
Stanford Univ., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC 12-15 (Aug. 22, 2003) 
(http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514
683884) [hereinafter Wu & Lessig, Ex Parte]. 
180 See Wu & Lessig, Ex Parte, supra note 179, at 12-15. 
181 See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 2, at 52; Yoo, Economics of 
Congestion, supra note 2, at 1887-89. 
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about architecture, pricing, and services.182  Yoo attacks network neutrality 
mandates on the grounds that they flatten such distinctions, and thereby reduce 
incentives for novel competitive entry in the broadband market.183  As an analogy, 
Yoo points to the NFL Sunday Ticket offering on the DirecTV direct broadcast 
satellite service.184  This exclusive football package encouraged many sports fans 
to select DirecTV over cable, increasing the competitiveness of the multi-channel 
video programming market. 
Whether or not Yoo is correct that the benefits of network diversity are 
superior to those of network neutrality, there is an important aspect of his 
analysis that bears highlighting.  The more “diverse” a new entrant’s business 
model, the more it will diverge from the universal connectivity model of the 
established Internet.  A network diversity principle would open the door for 
greater divergence from the experience of a single, uniform Internet.  This may be 
a worthwhile tradeoff, or there may be enough other constraints to prevent 
networks from straying too far from neutrality.  However, it is impossible to be 
certain. 
Variation among access providers is not the only trend that may cause the 
Internet to balkanize as an application platform.  Content and application 
providers may seek similar special deals with operators in situations where they 
feel they have leverage.  For example, ESPN, the cable sports programmer, offers 
a slate of special online content through ESPN360.com, which is only available to 
customers of broadband access providers that pay ESPN a supplemental fee.185  
The result is similar to what would happen if some broadband providers blocked 
the ESPN service, but in this case it is ESPN’s desirable content that drives the 
business relationship.  There is nothing fundamentally improper in ESPN or any 
other content provider holding out for such a payment.  Network neutrality 
proponents would distinguish the ESPN 360 arrangement on the grounds that 
ESPN lacks the market power or control over expensive physical infrastructure 
that might allow network operators to abuse their position.  The result, however, 
is to move closer to an environment that lacks the universality of today’s Internet. 
                                                        
182 Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 2, at 18-19. 
183 Yoo’s claim is that policy-makers should be most concerned about broadband 
competition, because it addresses the ultimate problem, and therefore the network 
neutrality tradeoff isn’t worth it.  See id. at 9. 
184 See id. at 32. 
185 See George Ou, Is ESPN Committing Reverse Net Neutrality?, ZDNET, June 21, 
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In the future, the underpinnings of the application-indifferent Internet are 
likely to break down further.  The rapid growth of online video distribution is 
causing network operators to consider deploying “deep packet inspection” 
capabilities to differentiate their treatment of traffic on an application-by-
application basis.186  Video files are so much larger than other forms of Internet 
content that they already make up a substantial portion of global Internet traffic, 
and a substantial majority of the bits flowing over many broadband access 
networks.187 
Therefore, access providers seeking to differentiate video traffic and charge 
differently for it, either to end-users or to content providers, can reasonably 
argue that they are simply making an efficient economic move.188  Much like 
firms practicing price discrimination in other industries, access providers will 
argue that if the relatively small number of heavy video users pay more, most 
users will pay less.189  Some broadband providers are cutting off or throttling back 
heavy users or file-sharing applications that they claim are monopolizing network 
bandwidth.190 
For wireless Internet access, most network operators already cap “unlimited” 
plans and charge special fees for applications such as live streaming TV and 
ringtone downloads.191  The wireless industry has a unique history, regulatory 
status, and technical issues.  Until recently, the “wireless Internet” was something 
of a misnomer.  Now, with devices such as the Apple iPhone promising a full Web 
experience and third-generation wireless networks delivering near-broadband 
speeds, the two worlds are converging.  If the result is something closer to the 
                                                        
186 See Andrew Packer, The True Picture of Peer-to-Peer Filesharing, CACHELOGIC 
PRESENTATION, July 2, 2004, at 12, available at 
http://www.cachelogic.com/press/CacheLogic_Press_and_Analyst_Presentation_July2
004.pdf. 
187 See Kevin Werbach, The Implications of Video P2P on Network Usage, in VIDEO 
PEER TO PEER 97, 101  (Eli M. Noam  & Lorenzo Maria Pupillo eds., 2008). 
188 Yoo, Economics of Congestion, supra note 2, at 1864. 
189 In economics, price discrimination has no derogatory connotation.  The idea is 
simply that firms can sometimes maximize total welfare by charging some customers 
more than others.  See generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES:  A 
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190 See Declan McCullagh, BitTorrent Firms:  Comcast Throttling Is Anticompetitive, 
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wireless model, it will represent a significant shift in how users experience the 
Internet. 
D. Digital Copyright:  Information Balkanization 
The final links holding the Internet together arise at the content layer, based 
on a set of legal constructs.  Specifically, content pulls itself together on the 
Internet through the widespread exploitation of a grey area in intellectual 
property law.  That grey area may soon divide into black and white boundaries.  If 
it does, the foundation for many Internet services that today are taken for 
granted, such as search engines, may disappear. 
This section elucidates, in Subpart 1, how intellectual property rules define 
the connective tissue of the Internet at the content layer.  Subpart 2 explains how 
litigation challenges threaten this connective tissue. 
1. Linkage at the content layer 
The content passing across the Internet is, like any other fixed expression of 
ideas, entitled to intellectual property protection.  The text of a Web page, or 
digital material such as books, songs, and television shows stored on file servers, 
are all subject to the infringement prohibitions of copyright law.  All property 
rights serve to distinguish one person’s assets, with their associated bundle of 
rights, from others’ assets.192  Drawing such boundaries produces tremendous 
benefits by unlocking the potential for investment and innovation associated with 
both tangible and intangible assets.193 
Yet the benefits of legal enforcement of property rights come at a cost.  
Property rights necessarily limit the freedom of non-owners.194  The dangers from 
over-aggressive enforcement of property rights are especially great for intangible 
                                                        
192 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT:  THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 6 
(2000); Kevin Werbach, Supercommons:  Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless 
Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 918 (2004) (“The question, therefore, is how to 
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193 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
350 (1967). 
194 See Werbach, supra note 192, at 885; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF 
IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 168 (2001), available at 
http://thefutureofideas.s3.amazonaws.com/lessig_FOI.pdf. 
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goods such as intellectual property, which are otherwise economically nonrival.195  
Without copyright protection, for example, everyone could have a copy of a song 
or a piece of software, without exhausting the resource.  Of course, such an 
arrangement would likely eliminate the economic incentive to create the 
resource, which is why some intellectual property protections are necessary.  
However, too stringent a regime can have spillover effects on innovation, and can 
produce a “tragedy of the anti-commons” in which too many fragmented owners 
prevent effective use of the resource.196 
Intellectual property on the Internet has been an active legal battleground.197  
To date however, there have been few overt controversies over unauthorized 
reuse of online content.  Search engines index, copy, and redisplay millions of 
pieces of copyrighted content every day without permission.198  Internet service 
providers and application providers host and aggregate information they do not 
own, and that in some cases infringes on the rights of content owners. 
Search engine indexing is perhaps the best example of accepted content reuse 
online.  We take it for granted that search engines such as Google, Ask.com and 
Yahoo! can index sites on the World Wide Web.199  Search engines are now so 
ingrained as the starting points for use of the Internet, and content reuse is so 
central to search engines, that the idea of their operation as a copyright violation 
at first is perplexing.  However, what most search engines do is, for their own 
economic benefit and without receiving any affirmative authorization, copy, 
store, and redisplay copyrighted content of other authors.200 
                                                        
195 See LESSIG, supra note 194, at 237. 
196 See Dan Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 49 
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199 See James Grimmelman, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 
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All major Internet search engines use the same basic approach.  They send 
out “spiders” — automated programs that follow hyperlinks from page to page on 
the web — recording information about those pages as they go along.  Among 
other things, the spiders copy the text of the page into the search engine’s 
database, typically in a compressed format to speed retrieval.201  Some search 
engines, most notably Google, also keep a full readable copy of most sites in their 
local database, allowing users to retrieve the page from the search engine’s cache 
rather than from the origin site itself.202 
Search engines therefore do many things that seem to constitute, at first 
glance, copyright infringement.203  Yet there has been little legal scrutiny of their 
behavior.  Only a handful of cases have parsed whether a search engine may be 
engaging in a copyright violation.204 
As a practical matter, content reuse is prevalent online because it benefits 
content owners.  Search engines are the starting points for most Internet users.  If 
something isn’t listed in a search engine, it effectively does not exist.  The search 
engines pass off users to the origin sites once they return their results, so allowing 
a search engine to index a page doesn’t prevent the content owner from 
monetizing that same page through advertisements or other means.  If pressed, 
search engines could advance three primary legal theories to defend their 
indexing of online content:  fair use, implied license, and statutory safe harbors. 
Fair use is a well established and statutorily grounded, yet notoriously vague, 
aspect of copyright law.  It allows re-use of copyrighted material under 
circumstances, such as educational applications, parodies, and de minimis 
copying, where the balance of equities favors the copier over the exclusion.205 
Search engines typically display only a small excerpt of the indexed page, with a 
                                                        
201 See id. at 7-8. 
202 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1156 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) 
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link to the original site.  However, this is not always the case.  Google caches and 
makes available the full text of most pages in its search index, and its book search 
service stores the full text of a book.206  An alternative hypothesis is that websites 
have tacitly and collectively authorized search engines to copy and index their 
pages, under the legal theory of implied license.207  Perhaps content providers 
would be entitled to stop search engines and other online service providers from 
using their content, but they simply have not.  Under an implied license theory, 
the content owners’ silence, with awareness about the scope of copying, is 
tantamount to a limited waiver of their intellectual property rights.208 
The final theory for content re-use is that it is protected under the legal safe 
harbors established under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Telecom 
Act”)209 or the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).210  Section 230 of the 
Telecom Act immunizes ISPs from liability for content that merely resides on 
their networks.211  Section 512 of the DMCA incorporates a more complex safe 
harbor regime, in which service providers must take down allegedly infringing 
materials upon notice from copyright holders in order to qualify.212 
 Though most Internet users and service providers take widespread online 
content reuse for granted, its foundations remain shaky.  Pending litigation may 
produce a dramatic change in the environment. 
                                                        
206 See Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use:  iTunes for Authors, or 
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2. Breakdown of voluntary content reuse 
Content owners are beginning to chafe at the ways that search engines and 
online service providers make use of their content.213  Moreover, online services 
are pushing the boundaries of copyright law in new ways, making content owners 
uncomfortable that they will lose control and revenues.  YouTube and other video 
sharing sites have exploded in popularity in recent years, with YouTube agreeing 
to sell itself to Google for over $1.5 billion less than two years after its launch.214 
Unlike Napster and other peer-to-peer file-sharing services, who argued they 
had no control over the content flowing across their networks, YouTube is a 
traditional central storage site, which hosts all videos available to its users.215  
YouTube’s defense to copyright infringement is squarely based on the DMCA safe 
harbor provisions.216  Some content owners are not satisfied that YouTube does 
all it could do to prevent infringing material from appearing on its site or to 
remove such material once it’s there.  As a result, content owners have begun 
filing suit.  Viacom’s lawsuit, seeking over $1 billion in damages from YouTube, is 
a high-profile test of YouTube’s claims.217 
Google’s Book Search service has also raised the issue of Internet content 
reuse.  Google has launched a massive project to digitally scan books and make 
them searchable through its search engine.218  Google’s project, in partnership 
with major university libraries, includes two components.  The first component 
involves scanning books that are in the public domain, primarily older works that 
are no longer covered by copyright protection.  The more controversial part of the 
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program involves scanning books that are still under copyright.219  For these 
works, Google places a complete copy of the scanned book in its database.  It 
indexes that material, so that a user can search on anything within the book.  
However, Google does not display the entire book, as it does for the public-
domain material.  It provides a small snippet of content around the search term, 
and a few excerpts from the original book.220 
Google claims that it is providing a service to both readers and publishers by 
making it easier to find books.221  From a legal perspective, Google argues that its 
actions are protected by fair use and by the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions.222  
The publishing industry sees it differently.  Google requires publishers to opt out 
of including their copyrighted works in the Book Search database, rather than 
gaining affirmative approval from each publisher for inclusion of a work.  In 
opposition to this procedure, the Author’s Guild and the Association of American 
Publishers filed copyright infringement suits against Google in 2005.223 
In launching its Book Search service, Google is betting that it will prevail in 
the copyright litigation.  If Google loses, the impact could go well beyond one 
company and one service.  A precedent requiring affirmative consent from 
copyright holders before indexing protected content would throw into question 
the more common practice of indexing Web content. 
Congress originally created the DMCA and Telecom Act safe harbor 
provisions to protect ISPs and online services, which necessarily stored user-
generated content.224  A safe harbor approach made sense because it would have 
been unreasonable to require access providers to vet every piece of content one of 
their users placed on their servers.  Google Book Search is a somewhat different 
situation.  In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme 
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Court ultimately imposed liability on a peer-to-peer file-sharing service, even 
though the service had the “substantial non-infringing uses” that would 
ordinarily be a shield against secondary liability.225  A similar decision in the 
Google Book Search or YouTube litigation could add devastating uncertainty to 
the entire Internet content economy. 
Google may be doing the right thing, and it may win the Book Search case.  
However, Internet content re-use is now subject to high-profile scrutiny and a 
direct legal challenge.  The content linkages that Internet users and businesses 
take for granted are in jeopardy.  There will be other lawsuits, and other efforts to 
erect barriers around information on the Internet.  As with governance, backbone 
interconnection, and network neutrality, the pressure is building to break down 
the pervasive connectivity that made the Internet what it is today. 
Why is the Internet fragmenting now?  There are many answers and many 
contributing factors.  Every development described in the previous section has its 
own specific causes.  Yet standing behind these local factors is a deeper, more 
universal reason for the current pattern:  the fundamental dynamics of 
interconnected networks. 
III.  NETWORK FORMATION DYNAMICS 
All networks share characteristic properties, which researchers have only 
recently begun to study closely.  A branch of network science known as network 
formation theory suggests exactly the pattern of fragmentation unfolding on the 
Internet today.  As some inter-network components — the U.S.-dominated 
addressing system, large backbones, broadband access providers, and Google, for 
example — achieve disproportionate power, they provoke countervailing efforts 
toward balkanization.  The simulations, models, and empirical research of 
network scientists, applied to the Internet, can aid in understanding these 
Internet developments and in developing appropriate responses. 
Network formation theory demonstrates that interconnected networks such 
as the Internet can grow quickly but also dissolve quickly.  The greatest threat to 
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continued stability is the network itself.  Growing networks of independent, 
economically motivated actors are inherently unstable.226  If they become stable, 
they are most likely configured inefficiently.227  Both outcomes pose threats to the 
continued vibrancy of the Internet. 
This Part introduces the science of networks and its implications for the 
future of the Internet.  Subpart A summarizes the key elements of network 
science.  Subpart B delves into the extension of network science — network 
formation theory — that is most relevant to the issues of Internet balkanization.  
Finally, Subpart C ties in two other key findings of network science — the “small-
worlds” effect and scale-free distributions — which are consistent with the 
network formation results. 
A. A New Science 
Networks are ubiquitous in modern society, as well as in the physical and 
biological world.228  In formal terms, a network is a collection of nodes tied 
together with links.229  In the airline industry, airports are the nodes and routes 
between them are the links.  In a social setting, the nodes may be the individuals, 
and the links their relationships: friendship, sexual contacts, or business 
partners.  In the Internet infrastructure, for example, the routers are the nodes 
and the data lines are the links.  On the Web, the web pages are the nodes and the 
hyperlinked pointers between them are the links.230  It is no coincidence that as 
communications, information, energy, logistics, and transportation networks 
have spread across the globe, network structures have assumed greater 
importance in society.231 
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Network science studies the generic properties of these and other networks.  
It draws upon several disciplines, including statistical physics, sociology, applied 
mathematics, biology, complexity theory, economics, and computer science.232  
Despite its broad area of inquiry and youth as a coherent field, network science 
has produced many impressive results.233  One of network science’s leading 
practitioners labels it “the science of the connected age.”234  Insights from 
network science are starting to be applied to legal questions.235  In recent years, 
scholars have utilized network science to analyze business models for electronic 
commerce,236 pricing regulation for unbundled telecommunications network 
elements,237 the patent system,238 privacy,239 and Internet security.240  Network 
science is also beginning to show up in the analysis of information and 
communications policy questions.241 
                                                        
232 The boundaries of these various disciplines are not universally accepted.  In 
particular, scholars differ on whether network science is a sub-discipline of complexity 
theory, or the reverse, and use a variety of terms to refer to both fields. Adding to the 
confusion, some of the literature uses the terms “network science” or “network theory” to 
describe what this paper treats as sub-domains of the larger field, particularly the 
economic scholarship around network effects. In this paper, I use the term “network 
science” to address those disciplines concerned with the behavior of complex, evolving, 
networked systems.  
233 See generally BUCHANAN, supra note 228 (summarizing significant findings of 
network theory); WATTS, supra note 228 (explaining same). 
234 That is the subtitle of Watts’s book, Six Degrees.  See WATTS, supra note 228; see 
also M.E.J. Newman, The Structure and Function of Complex Networks, 45 SIAM REV. 
167, 180-96 (2003) (describing common properties of networks). 
235 See Strandburg, supra note 3, at 1295 n.6 (noting relative paucity but significant 
richness of legal scholarship using tools from network science). 
236 See generally CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL:  WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS 
SELLING LESS OF MORE  (2006) (showing how “power law” distributions, a concept from 
network theory, appear commonly in e-commerce markets). 
237 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 229, at 1707. 
238 See Strandburg, supra note 3, at 1318-19. 
239 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
919, 946-47 (2005). 
240  See Réka Albert et al., Error and Attack Tolerance of Complex Networks, 406 
NATURE 378, 380-82 (2000).  But see David Alderson & Walter Willinger, A Contrasting 
Look at Self-Organization in the Internet and Next-Generation Communications 
Networks, IEEE COMM., July 2005, at 94, 96 (noting that descriptions of Internet 
structure based on statistical physics fail to capture properties derived from its actually 
engineering design). 
241 See generally David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing On Every 
Continent”:  Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex 
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Network science covers a great deal of ground.  One branch in particular 
helps to explain the balkanization dynamics described in Part II.  That branch is 
known as network formation theory. 
B. Network Formation Theory 
1. In general 
Networks can be seen as either exogenous or endogenous factors to the 
behavior being studied.  If exogenous, the network is taken as a given, and the 
question is what participants in that network are likely to do.  This is the stance of 
most communications and Internet law scholarship.242  Looking only at what 
happens once networks exist is a valuable simplifying assumption.  Yet in the real 
world, participants also decide whether to form networks, or to form new links 
within those networks.  For example, people evaluate whether to become friends 
with each other and Internet backbones evaluate whether to peer. 
A full picture of network behavior must therefore consider networks as 
endogenous factors as well.  In other words, networks both produce and are 
produced by a collection of interactions.  There is a branch of network science 
called network formation that treats networks endogenously.243  Network 
formation theory is a newer field of scholarship than network science generally.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998) (using complexity theory, cousin of network 
science, to address Internet governance questions); Mark Cooper, Making the 
Connection:  Using Network Theory to Explain the Link Between Open Digital Platforms 
and Innovation (Mar. 24, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/ 
blogs/cooper/archives/network%20theory.pdf) (applying network theory to 
telecommunications policy).  
242 Daniel Spulber and Christopher Yoo, in their graph-theoretic analysis of 
telecommunications interconnection pricing, expressly limit their consideration to what 
they call “managed” networks, as opposed to the “spontaneous” networks that form 
endogenously, even though they acknowledge that “the latter type may ultimately become 
the more important way to analyze communications technologies.”  See Spulber & Yoo, 
supra note 229, at 1693 n.16.  Intriguingly, their rationale for this limitation is “the 
dominance of a handful of infrastructure providers.”  Id. 
243 See Matthew O. Jackson, A Survey of Models of Network Formation:  Stability 
and Efficiency, in GROUP FORMATION IN ECONOMICS:  NETWORKS, CLUBS AND COALITIONS 
11, 25-26 (Gabrielle Demange & Myrna Wooders eds., 2005), available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm/netsurv.pdf; Matthew O. Jackson, Network 
Formation, in 5 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 906, 907 (Steven N. 
Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blumem eds., 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Jackson, Network 
Formation]. 
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As such, there are many questions it has yet to tackle in both the theoretical and 
empirical cases.244  Therefore, application of network formation theory to 
concrete questions of Internet law and governance must necessarily be 
preliminary and tentative. 
Nonetheless, the major findings of network formation provide significant 
insights regarding the future of the Internet.245  In addition to modeling the 
feedback effects that participants exert on the network itself, network formation 
expressly considers network structure.246  Different structures have important 
consequences, such as the ease of reaching another user on the network and the 
power of highly connected nodes on the network.247 
There are two broad classes of network formation models.248  One set, based 
on the mathematical domain of graph theory, treats link formation as essentially 
random.  This first set seeks to explain how observed properties in real-world 
networks could develop through network growth dynamics.249  The other models, 
employing game-theoretic techniques from economics, treat link formation as a 
strategic decision of individual, self-interested agents.250  These economic models  
can measure the relative social welfare benefits of different network structures, 
and can better explain why those outcomes emerge.251  The economic models, 
however, come up short in describing how networks progress through the 
formation process and what they will look like at the end of the process.  Despite 
                                                        
244 See Jackson, supra note 24, at 319 (“[W]e are only beginning to develop 
theoretical models that are useful in a systematic analysis of how such network structures 
form and what their characteristics are likely to be.”). 
245 See ROMUALDO PASTOR-SATORRAS & ALESSANDRO VESPINGANI, EVOLUTION AND 
STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNET:  A STATISTICAL PHYSICS APPROACH 84 (2004) (“In recent 
years we have witnessed a change of perspective in the theoretical study of complex 
networks that shifts the modeling focus from the reproduction of the network’s structure 
to the modeling of its evolution.  This new approach is the outcome of the realization that 
most complex networks — the Internet being only one of the most important examples — 
are the result of a growth process.”) 
246 See Jackson, supra note 24, at 319. 
247 See generally WATTS, supra note 228 (detailing dynamics of different types of 
networks). 
248 See Matthew O. Jackson, The Economics of Social Networks, in 1 ADVANCES IN 
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS:  THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, NINTH WORLD CONGRESS, at 1, 
11 (Richard Blundell et al. eds., 2006). 
249 See infra Part III.B.2. 
250 See infra Part III.B.3. 
251 See Jackson, supra note 248, at 20-33. 
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the limitations of each method, taken together, the two approaches paint a rich 
picture of network formation.252  The combination of these methods forms a set 
of tools and techniques for evaluating normative questions about Internet 
evolution. 
2. Random network formation  
The seminal early work in network formation, by Paul Erdős and Alfred Rényi 
in the 1950s, modeled networks as what are called “random graphs”:  sets of 
nodes between which links were randomly added.253  Erdős and Rényi found that 
these random graphs experienced a “phase transition” as the density of links 
increased relative to the number of nodes.254  At that point, the networks rapidly 
shifted from collections of small, discrete components to a single “giant 
component,” which incorporated the vast majority of the nodes.255  In other 
words, networks with enough links tend towards interconnection.256  They pull 
themselves together. 
The random graph studies show that the key factor in whether networks come 
together is not their size, but their connectivity.257  The more connections there 
are between participants on the network, the more likely it is that those 
participants will share a common platform.258  In the real world, network links do 
not simply appear arbitrarily; they have a cost.  If links are cheaper to establish, 
                                                        
252 The approaches are not in conflict; they are different means of evaluating network 
formation.  The scholars developing random and strategic network formation models 
were generally unaware of each other until recently.  One of the signal developments in 
the emergence of network formation as a distinct branch of network theory is the 
appreciation of the complementary nature of the two approaches.  See id.  
253 See generally DOUGLAS B. WEST, INTRODUCTION TO GRAPH THEORY (2d ed. 2001) 
(describing graph theory); Paul Erdős & Alfred Rényi, On Random Graphs, 6 
PUBLICATIONES MATHEMATICAE DEBRECEN 290 (1959) (modeling random graphs). 
254 The number of links per node is called the degree of that node.  See Jackson, supra 
note 248, at 3-4.  The phase transition in a random graph network occurs when the 
average degree of the network exceeds one.  See id. at 13. 
255 See id. at 13. 
256 These models do not take into account the ownership structures of the component 
networks.  As noted in the previous section, the outcome in the real world may either be a 
single dominant network operator, or a constellation of interconnected providers.  See 
Lemley & McGowen, supra note 41, at 549-50; infra text accompanying note 345. 
257 See Jackson, supra note 248, at 13-14. 
258 See id. 
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there will be more of them, which therefore makes an interconnected platform 
more likely. 
This has, in fact, been the case.  Researcher Tom Vest engaged in a large study 
of “autonomous network” data measuring the degree of connectivity on the 
Internet.259  He found that the key variable explaining the rate of Internet 
penetration worldwide is the availability and pricing of telecommunications 
circuits.260  Similar examples can be adduced at other layers.  In content, for 
example, the fact that search engines need not negotiate and pay a market 
clearing price to incorporate online content into their indexes allows those 
indexes to cover a large percentage of the publicly accessible Web, rather than 
just selected portions of it.261 
The point here is not just the obvious one that cheaper links mean more links, 
but that cheaper links are more likely to produce a universally interconnected 
platform.  The reverse is also true.  As links become more expensive, and thus 
rarer, the network may experience a phase transition in reverse.  Instead of 
connectivity decaying gradually, the network may quickly switch from one in 
which the bulk of users can communicate to one in which most users are trapped 
in discrete sub-networks.262  Thus, network science sounds the cautionary alarm 
that networks may balkanize more rapidly and more extensively than would be 
expected. 
3. Strategic network formation 
The limitation of the random-graph models of network formation is that they 
do not examine why links form.  They simply assume a random process, or some 
arbitrary algorithm.  An alternate and complementary approach, grounded in 
economic theory, begins with the recognition that the participants in networks 
are self-interested actors.263  These actors are focused on maximizing their own 
welfare, not the aggregate behavior of the network.  Their decisions, far from 
                                                        
259 Telephone Interview with Tom Vest, Senior Economist & Policy Analyst, Coop. 
Ass’n for Internet Data Analysis (Sept. 12, 2006). 
260 See id. 
261 Because search engines operate by sending out spiders that crawl the Web through 
its links, content that is not connected to other portions of the network may be “invisible” 
to them. 
262 See Jackson, supra note 248, at 14-15. 
263 See id. at 20-33.  
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being random, reflect strategic tradeoffs based on the environment they see 
around them.264  Such situations are the domain of game theory. 
Game theory is an area of economics that studies strategic interactions 
between independent actors (called “agents”) by modeling them as games.265  
Consider a group of agents, who may be individuals, companies, or other actors, 
that are potentially part of a network.  Each agent must decide whether to form a 
link between its node and those of other agents.266  The agent decides whether to 
form the link by evaluating the relative costs and benefits of establishing the link.  
If two agents find that the benefits of connecting exceed the costs, they will do so. 
Agents benefit not only from their own links, but from the ability to reach 
others on the network with whom they are not directly connected.  For example, 
Internet users benefit from the peering relationships between one ISP’s backbone 
and other backbones, even though users are not part of those negotiations.  A 
user’s ability to locate documents on the Web increases when someone else 
creates a link to it.  This is because the link increases the likelihood that a search 
engine spider will find a given document and because search engines will utilize 
that link structure to match that document with the user’s query.267  The potential 
disconnect between the private calculus of agents, who selfishly act based on their 
own cost-benefit calculations, and the real welfare calculus for those agents, 
which depends on collective behavior, is a central subject for game theory.268  The 
balkanization of the Internet is an example of just such behavior.269 
A burgeoning body of game-theoretic literature seeks to model how the 
collective behavior of self-interested network nodes produces global network 
                                                        
264 See id. 
265 See generally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991) (describing 
game theory).  Game theory is the field in which John Nash, the subject of the book and 
movie, A Beautiful Mind, won the Nobel Prize. The Nash Equilibrium is the point in any 
game where no agent would benefit by altering its strategy. 
266 For simplicity, this discussion, and the earlier discussion of graph theory, uses 
examples of “non-directed” graphs, in which both sides must agree to form a link.  There 
are also “directed” graphs, such as the network of citations among academic papers.  
Citations flow in only one direction; the cited paper has no say in the decision.   
267 See supra Part II.D. 
268 This is an example of the famous “prisoner’s dilemma,” in which two agents will 
fail to cooperate, even though doing so would make them both better off. 
269 See supra Part II. 
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structures.270  Agents are given cost-benefit functions for linking with other 
nodes, which can incorporate not only the direct benefit to the connected nodes, 
but the indirect network effects that propagate out to other nodes.271  These 
models reveal the equilibrium points that networks may evolve toward as their 
participants employ various strategies to maximize their own welfare. 
A key dimension of network formation models is pairwise stability, which was 
introduced by Matthew Jackson and Asher Wolinsky.272  A network is considered 
pairwise stable if no node would be better off by severing one of its links, and no 
two nodes would benefit from adding a new link between them.273  For example, 
an Internet backbone must constantly decide whether to add additional peering 
points with other backbones, or to eliminate existing connections.  It will weigh 
the costs and benefits of each decision.  Given a particular scenario, there may be 
no pairwise stable network equilibrium.  If there are one or more pairwise stable 
outcomes, the models show that those network structures will likely emerge.274 
A different criterion for evaluating networks is their efficiency — the extent to 
which networks maximize aggregate utility for their participants. From an 
economic standpoint, the goals of law and public policy are to maximize social 
welfare.  A network configuration that makes a few nodes better off, but most 
nodes worse off, is undesirable.276  Highly concentrated networks, in which one 
node dominates, are also unlikely to be efficient unless the value to the central 
node is so enormous that it exceeds the cost to the other nodes. 
                                                        
270 See Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, A Strategic Model of Social and 
Economic Networks, 71 J. ECON. THEORY 44, 45-48 (1996); Jackson, supra note 24, at 
319-20. 
271 See, e.g., Jackson & Wolinsky, supra note 270 (modeling network stability and 
efficiency using this approach).  The network formation models use the generic concept of 
nodes.  They apply to collections of networks deciding whether to federate and to 
individual users or companies determining whether to join a network. 
272 See id. at 47-48. 
273 See Jackson, Network Formation, supra note 243, at 27-28; Jackson & Wolinsky, 
supra note 270, at 51; Jackson, supra note 24, at 336.  As a somewhat stylized concept, 
pairwise stability only gives an indication of the robustness of a network.  It does not 
mean that the network will no longer evolve, or that it will not disintegrate.  See Jackson, 
supra note 24, at 336. 
274 See Jackson & Wolinsky, supra note 270, at 45 (“This analysis is designed to give 
us some predictions concerning which networks are likely to form . . . .”). 
276 For simplicity, this example assumes that the harm or benefit to each node is the 
same. 
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To express the two technical terms colloquially, efficient networks are the 
networks we want while stable networks are those we are likely to get.  The key 
question is: When are stable networks also efficient, and vice versa?  
Unfortunately, the strategic network formation models show that efficiency and 
pairwise stability are often at odds.277  Stable networks may not be efficient, and 
efficient networks may not be stable.  One reason for this apparent tension is 
network effects.278  Decisions to form or sever links produce significant 
externalities,279 meaning that individual nodes may not accurately perceive the 
overall costs and benefits to the network.280  A second reason is that networks 
with a few highly connected hubs may be efficient, but the less-connected nodes 
will then have incentives to connect directly, undermining the disproportionate 
power of the hubs.281 
Another class of strategic network formation models uses the engineering 
concept of optimization rather than purely game-theoretic approaches.282  Under 
a highly optimized tolerance (“HOT”) model, network nodes seek the optimal 
balance between conflicting incentives to minimize cost and maximize value for 
the network as a whole.283  Cost is an important constraint in the real world, 
where some links are more expensive to construct than others.  A link across a 
large physical distance may be too costly to build, even though it would 
significantly improve the connectivity of a given node.  In the HOT model, nodes 
balance a cost constraint (minimizing the physical distance to other connected 
nodes), against a value constraint (shortening the number of hops to the central 
network hubs).  The magnitude of both the cost and value variables will lead the 
network to evolve into a more or less centrally clustered structure. 
                                                        
277 See Jackson & Wolinsky, supra note 270, at 59-60. 
278 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
279 An externality is a cost or benefit from an action that the actor itself does not 
naturally perceive or take into account when choosing to act or refrain from acting.  
Pollution from factories is a classic negative externality. 
280 See Jackson, supra note 24, at 319. 
281 See id. at 349-50.  This is essentially the scale-free dynamics described below. 
282 See Alderson & Willinger, supra note 240, at 96. 
283 See J.M. Carlson & John Doyle, Highly Optimized Tolerance:  A Mechanism for 
Power Laws in Designed Systems, 60 PHYSICAL REV. E 1412, 1423-26 (1999) [hereinafter 
Carlson & Doyle, Mechanism for Power]; J.M. Carlson & John Doyle, Highly Optimized 
Tolerance:  Robustness and Design in Complex Systems, 84 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 
2529, 2529 (2000) [hereinafter Carlson & Doyle, Robustness and Design]. 
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The network formation studies offer a rich and multi-dimensional picture of 
how networks grow and develop.  Intriguingly, their findings are consistent with 
two other major insights of network science — small worlds and scale-free 
distributions.  Adding these concepts provides an even clearer picture of how and 
why networks such as the Internet come together and then fragment. 
C. Disproportionate Power:  Small Worlds and Scale-Free Dynamics  
Among the most notable discoveries of network science are two surprising 
properties of many networks: “small-worlds” behavior and scale-free patterns.  
Each has significant legal and policy implications.  Specifically, small worlds and 
scale-free distributions although expressing different concepts, both mean that 
some nodes or clusters of the network can attain disproportionate power merely 
through natural network processes.  These insights are consistent with the 
findings of network formation theory that networks may reach an equilibrium 
with a small number of dominant hubs.  They further illustrate how some actors 
in an environment such as the Internet can take advantage of inter-connectivity 
to produce an environment that ultimately undermines the network. 
1. It is a small world after all 
The small-worlds phenomenon is embodied in the famous concept of “six 
degrees of separation,” immortalized in a popular play and movie of the same 
name.284  The original concept came from an experiment that psychologist 
Stanley Milgram conducted in the 1960s.285  Milgram asked a group of people to 
send a letter to someone they knew, who could in turn pass it along to a particular 
unknown recipient in another state.  It took approximately six steps on average 
for the letters that were received at the final destination.  Given the population 
and geographical dispersion of the United States, this was a shockingly small 
number.286  Similar findings appear in a wide variety of networks.  For example, 
                                                        
284 See generally JOHN GUARE, SIX DEGREES OF SEPARATION (1992). 
285 Stanley Milgram, The Small World Problem, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May 1967, at 60, 
60-68 (1967). 
286 Contrary to popular belief, Milgram’s experiment did not prove that there are only 
six degrees of separation between any two people.  For example, only letters that arrived 
at the destination were counted.  Three-fourths never got there.  See Judith S. Kleinfeld, 
The Small World Problem, SOC’Y, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 61, 62-64.  The significance of 
Milgram’s work is that it showed the presence of short paths through the network, in the 
days before computer simulations could demonstrate such behavior formally. 
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there are an average of less than four links between any two actors (treating co-
starring in a movie as a link),287 and only about three hyperlinks on average 
between documents in a sampling of 50 million World Wide Web pages.288 
In the 1990s, network scientists, most prominently Duncan Watts,289 
generalized and explained the operation of the small-worlds phenomenon.  The 
diameter of a network — the average number of links between any two arbitrary 
nodes — tends to grow much more slowly than the number of nodes. In other 
words, two users on a big network can reach each other without traversing many 
more links than they would on a small network.291  In a famous paper, Watts and 
Steven Strogatz showed how a simple network with only local connections 
between adjacent nodes (and therefore a large diameter between distant nodes) 
could turn into a small world through the random insertion of a few “shortcut” 
connections.292  A small number of long-distance links transforms the 
connectivity patterns of the network. 
From a network formation perspective, the small-worlds phenomena can be 
explained as a strategic equilibrium among network participants.293  Most links 
are local.  Long-distance links are costly to create and usually involve weaker 
connections.  Long-distance links are therefore rare.  Once established, however, 
long-distance links are a source of significant value-creation because they 
dramatically shorten paths across the entire network.294  Viewed another way, the 
                                                        
287 See Duncan J. Watts & Steven H. Strogatz, Collective Dynamics of “Small World” 
Networks, 393 NATURE 440, 441 tbl.1 (1998).  A humorous parlor game called Six Degrees 
of Kevin Bacon takes advantage of this fact to trace the relationship of any actor through a 
chain of co-stars to Kevin Bacon.  WATTS, supra note 228, at 93-95. 
288 See Lada Adamic, The Small World Web, 1696 LECTURE NOTES COMPUTER SCI. 443, 
444 (1999), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/ 4fjgx8c7m92nqe05/ 
fulltext.pdf. 
289 See generally WATTS, supra note 228 (elaborating on small worlds phenomenon). 
291 In addition to being small worlds, social networks also tend to be highly clustered.  
This means that if one node in a linked pair connects to a different node, the second node 
in the pair is likely to as well, forming a triangular structure.  The coexistence of small 
worlds and clustering is surprising.  The former suggests that there are many long-
distance “shortcuts” across the network, while the latter implies that nodes are densely 
interconnected with their close neighbors.  The Watts-Strogatz model showed 
theoretically how such network properties could emerge simultaneously.  See Watts & 
Strogatz, supra note 287, at 441. 
292 See id. 
293 See Jackson, supra note 248, at 27-28. 
294 This work parallels the findings of sociologists and management scholars, such as 
Ronald Burt of the University of Chicago, who study the effects of social capital in 
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long-distance links control valuable assets, not because they are bottlenecks in 
the traditional market power sense, but because they reduce the effective network 
diameter for everyone else.  Those who control such network shortcuts, whether 
address databases that facilitate connections to distant websites or the search 
engines that send users to the distant reaches of the Web, are in an enviable 
economic position. 
Moreover, the entire Internet is a collection of long-distance links between 
discrete, locally connected networks.295  Although the Internet appears to be 
smooth and featureless, it is actually a group of islands with links between them.  
There are fewer of those links than one might imagine, and their importance to 
the network as a whole is greater than it appears. 
2. Scale-free networks:  the rich get richer 
Network science’s second prominent finding is scale-free dynamics.  
Researchers, including Albert-László Barabási, developed the theory of scale-free 
networks based on the observation that in many networks, some nodes are vastly 
more connected than others.296  For example, the most connected pages on the 
Web, the most connected electric power substations in the Western United 
States, and the most active protein in the metabolism of yeasts are all orders of 
magnitude more connected than the average node in those networks.297  Put 
another way, the frequency of different connectivity levels of nodes (formally 
known as the degree of those nodes) is not a bell curve (Gaussian) distribution in 
which medium levels of connectivity are most common and high or low 
connectivity is relatively uncommon.  It is instead a power-law distribution, 
meaning that each degree of connectivity is exponentially more rare.298  This 
produces a distribution curve with a narrow, tall “head” and a long, fat “tail.”  A 
                                                                                                                                                       
business.  See generally RONALD BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES:  THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF 
COMPETITION (1992) (illustrating the value of long-distance links in business). 
295 See supra Part II.B. 
296 See generally ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED:  HOW EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED 
TO EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS  (2002) (describing the major findings of 
network science). 
297 See Newman, supra note 234, at 187. 
298 The term “scale-free” arises from the fact that no level of connectivity is typical for 
the network. The function for describing the curve is exponential.  Represented 
graphically, the “long tail” curve has a head that is extremely high and narrow, but a tail 
that is extremely long and flat. 
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tiny number of nodes have massive numbers of links, and very many nodes have 
few or no links. 
The scale-free pattern arises from a phenomenon known as preferential 
attachment.299  When new nodes join the network, they do not connect randomly 
to other nodes.300  They are more likely to connect to nodes that are already well 
connected.  For example, a new link on the Web is more likely to point to an 
already-popular site because those are the sites most people are familiar with and 
find interesting.  When new Internet users ask their friends what search engine to 
use, they are most likely to tell them to use Google.  When a new network 
backbone seeks a peering relationship, it is more likely to first approach the 
largest, best connected existing network. 
Both the physical routers making up the Internet and the links connecting 
web pages exhibit a scale-free structure.301  Network theorists have concluded 
from this that the Internet is both more stable and more vulnerable than 
previously thought.302  It is more stable because the vast majority of nodes are 
relatively unimportant and can be knocked out without significant effects on 
network-wide connectivity.  Conversely, it is more vulnerable because a few key 
nodes are so densely connected that a coordinated attack on them would quickly 
break up the network.303  Consistent with the network formation analysis, the 
Internet turns out to be both robust and at risk at the same time.304 
The scale-free dynamics of the Internet are dangerous because those 
participants that are not at the top of the power-law curve may choose 
balkanization over losing out to the most connected node.305  Remember that, as 
                                                        
299 See generally BARABÁSI, supra note 296 (discussing preferential attachment and 
related concepts). 
300 Hence, the basic Erdős-Rényi random graph model fails to account for significant 
properties in observed real-world networks.  See Erdős & Rényi, supra note 253, at 290-
97.  Modifications to the random graph model can, however, produce scale-free behavior. 
301 See id. 
302 See Andres Guadamuz, Scale-Free Law:  Network Science and Copyright, 70 ALB. 
L. REV. 1297, 1304 (2008). 
303 See Albert, supra note 240, at 380-81.  But see Andrei Broder et al., Graph 
Structure in the Web, 33 COMPUTER NETWORKS 309, 309-10 (2000) (offering more 
nuanced picture of large scale structure of Web); Cooper, supra note 241, at 24. 
304 See Jackson, supra note 248, at 12; supra Part III.B.2. 
305 That appears to be what is happening in several of the case studies above.  See 
supra Part II. 
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the network formation literature demonstrated, the shift from a network that 
offers near-universal connectivity to disconnected islands can be abrupt.306  Just 
as a small-world network is unusually dependent on its few “shortcut” links, a 
scale-free network is unusually dependent on its dominant nodes.307 
Sociologist Saskia Sassen makes an analogous point in her analysis of cities 
and globalization.308  Even as production is increasingly distributed around the 
globe, she notes, management functions and their associated support services 
become increasingly centralized in a few highly concentrated “global cities.”309  
This creates risks of catastrophic failure, especially as poorly connected regions 
fail to reap the promised benefits of global connectivity.  Sassen points out that 
cyberspace, being embedded in the larger dynamics of society, is not immune 
from these forces.310  Thus, the countervailing pressures of centralization and 
decentralization within society also operate directly on the Internet.  Sassen’s 
analysis illustrates how universal system dynamics can have tremendous real-
world consequences.  The Internet is not immune from the tensions of 
globalization.  Its fate may be an illustration of them. 
As this Part has shown, theoretical models of networks tell a story that is 
entirely consistent with the general dynamic of a network at war with itself 
                                                        
306 See supra Part III.B.2.  In scale-free networks, other aspects of network structure 
influence the likelihood of a phase transition between lightly connected and highly 
connected networks, as compared to random graphs where the relative number of links to 
nodes is the primary variable.  See Newman, supra note 234, at 225-28. 
307 Random network formation models can be modified to incorporate preferential 
attachment, and thereby produce scale-free networks.  See Jackson, supra note 248, at 
16-17.  The strategic network formation models have a more difficult time accounting for 
this phenomenon.  They treat link formation as an economic weighing of costs and 
benefits, rather than a decision shaped by previous behavior. 
308 See Sassen, supra note 62, at 21 (“[W]hile regionally oriented firms need not 
negotiate the complexities of international borders and the regulations of different 
countries, they are still faced with a regionally dispersed network of operations that 
requires centralized control and servicing.”). 
309 See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY (2001) (explaining the concept of 
global cities); Sassen, supra note 62, at 15 (“This dynamic of simultaneous geographic 
dispersal and concentration is one of the key elements in the organizational architecture 
of the global economic system.”). 
310 Saskia Sassen, The Topoi of E-Space:  Global Cities and Global Value Chains, in 
SARAI READER 01:  THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 24, 24-25 (2001), available at 
http://www.sarai.net/publications/readers/01-the-public-domain (follow “The Topoi of 
E Space:  Global cities and global value chains – Saskia Sassen – 24” hyperlink); cf. Julie 
Cohen, Cyberspace and/or Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 212-13 (2007) (describing 
interrelationship of cyberspace and physical space). 
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outlined in Part I, and the stories of Internet balkanization in practice in Part II.  
The remaining question is what, if anything, should be done about this trend. 
IV.  ONE NETWORK OR MANY? 
The choice facing policy makers today is whether to allow the Internet to 
fragment, or to reinforce the norms that helped to pull it together.  The dynamics 
of network formation, small worlds, and scale-free structures will produce a more 
balkanized environment unless external regulatory forces are brought to bear.  
An examination of the Internet’s history shows that open federation of disparate 
systems creates innumerable benefits.  Network effects, a fundamental concept 
that has been incorporated into network science, sharpens the explanation of why 
the composite structure of the Internet creates value that independent networks 
could not.311 
Regulators, legislators, and courts should promote the continued integration 
of networks and systems into the interoperable Internet.  Historical examples, 
such as the privatization of the Internet backbone, show that government can 
simultaneously facilitate both interconnection and competition.  Federation and 
uniformity are not the best answer in every situation, but the modeling 
techniques of network science provide a rich toolkit to assess the implications of 
different network structures. 
This Part suggests some guidelines to aid policy makers in mapping network 
science to network law and regulation.  Subpart A offers an historical and 
technical picture of how the Internet became such as unifying force, illustrating 
the role of conscious design.  Subpart B explains the economics of network 
effects, and how they further explain the benefits of a federated Internet.  Finally, 
Subpart C offers some initial thoughts for translating these concepts into 
prospective policy decisions. 
                                                        
311 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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A. How the Internet Came Together 
1. The ends as the means 
One of the central lessons of network science is that the same collection of 
actors will produce different results based on the way their connections are 
wired.312  In other words, the characteristics of networks strongly influence their 
ultimate utility.313  The Internet and the public switched telephone network 
(“PSTN”) use the same physical infrastructure.  However, their economic and 
social outputs are very different, for example, because their connections are 
structured differently.  The PSTN is a “circuit-switched” network in which 
powerful phone company switches control the flow of information.  The Internet 
is a “packet-switched” network, which decentralizes traffic management to the 
real-time decisions of individual routers.314 
The dominant project of cyberlaw is to parse the implications of the Internet’s 
structural rules or “code.”315  Legal scholars seeking to explain the Internet’s 
dynamism as a unified platform have emphasized a particular structural factor:  
the so-called “end-to-end” model.316  An end-to-end network is one that pushes 
control out to the endpoints.317  The network focuses on moving bits from one 
place to another, without considering what those bits contain.  Any edge device, 
                                                        
312 See generally Yannis Ioannides, Random Graphs and Social Networks:  An 
Economics Perspective (Tufts Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 518, 2006) (explaining 
how network science improves on overly simplistic economic models that merely 
aggregate individuals); supra Part III (EXPLANATORY PARENTHETICAL). 
313 See WATTS, supra note 228, at 244 (“The structure of the network can have as 
great an influence on the success or failure of an innovation as the inherent appeal of the 
innovation itself.”). 
314 A packet-switched network routes individual packets, which are small chunks of 
data, while a circuit-switched network keeps open the same circuit for an entire call.  See 
Werbach, supra note 42, at 17.  The distinction between packet and circuit switching is 
one of many structural differences between the Internet and the PSTN.  See id. 
315 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 107-108 (1999). 
316 The classic statement of the end-to-end model was a 1981 paper by computer 
scientists Jerome Saltzer, David Clark, and David Reed.  See Jerome Saltzer et al., End-
to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277, 278 
(1984).  Its implications for innovation were later famously explained in the work of 
David Isenberg and Lawrence Lessig.  See LESSIG, supra note 194, at 34-35; David 
Isenberg, The Rise of the Stupid Network, COMPUTER TELEPHONY, Aug. 1997, at 16, 16; 
Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:  Preserving the Architecture of 
the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 931 (2001). 
317 See Saltzer et al., supra note 316, at 278. 
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such as a computer or mobile phone, can add a new application, and those edge 
devices are solely responsible for factors such as reliability and security that 
ensure the success of that application.  Because innovations do not require the 
consent or updating of the network core, those innovations can be deployed more 
quickly.318  As edge devices become more powerful, which they do as computing 
power improves over time, their enhancements can immediately be joined to the 
network.  So, new services such as Google, Skype, Hotmail, Facebook, and 
Amazon.com can catch on and grow rapidly, generating significantly more social 
and economic benefits than in a network like the PSTN, where central control 
nodes must approve new features.319 
The end-to-end model emphasizes only one side of the equation — the edges. 
The Internet gives extraordinary power to its endpoints, but it also embodies 
linkages between those endpoints, and between aggregations of systems that 
connect into a composite network.  The fact that the edges of the network define 
the applications say nothing about how those edges are wired together.  An 
endpoint can offer a brilliant innovation, but such innovation will be of no value 
if other endpoints cannot access it, or cannot access it easily.320  Something more 
than the end-to-end principle must explain how the Internet holds together. 
2. Connected by design 
Like any network, the Internet is, to a great extent, a product of the design 
parameters under which it was created.321  While the end-to-end model 
accurately describes the orientation of the engineers who designed the Internet, it 
was a retroactive explanation of the network’s architecture, rather than a 
guideline for its design.322  The actual development of the Internet focused not on 
the edges, but on the links. 
                                                        
318 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 316, at 930-31. 
319 See id. at 931; Zittrain, supra note 137, at 2021-22.  Zittrain argues that, absent 
intervention, the edge devices on the Internet will increasingly be locked-down, special-
purpose devices, rather than the general-purpose computers that generate innovation.  
See Zittrain, supra note 137, at 1977-78, 2002. 
320 The “ease” of access may involve several dimensions, including cost, speed, and 
reliability. 
321 See generally Varnelis, supra note 62 (discussing design parameters of Internet). 
322 The Saltzer, Clark, and Reed paper that articulated the end-to-end principle was 
published nearly a decade after the basic Internet protocols were adopted.  See Saltzer et 
al., supra note 316, at 278. 
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Histories of the Internet typically trace its ancestry from broad concepts such 
as packet switching, developed by Paul Baran, to the first implementation in the 
ARPANet of the U.S. Department of Defense, to the civilian NSFNet, to its 
commercialization and privatization into the Internet we know today.323  While 
not inaccurate, such a timeline de-emphasizes the key shift in moving from the 
ARPANet to the Internet:  the emphasis on internetworking.  The ARPANet was a 
single, integrated network.  The NSFNet, and the fully private Internet that 
succeeded it, were collections of interconnected but separately managed 
networks. 
For those who created it, the Internet had one paramount objective:  it was 
designed to transport packets of data transparently across a network of 
networks.324  It is hard to imagine today, when the Internet is synonymous with 
data connectivity, but there were already research and academic networks before 
the Internet came about.  The difference was that these networks were typically 
limited to local systems or specific services.325  The Internet was designed to 
break down those boundaries. 
The Internet protocol was designed to be lightweight enough to ride on top of 
any available network infrastructure.326  Other protocols and their 
implementations followed “Postel’s Law,” named after Jon Postel, one of the key 
members of the Internet engineering community.327  Postel’s dictate, in order to 
                                                        
323 See Werbach, supra note 42, at 13-16; supra text accompanying note 43. 
324 See David Clark, The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet Protocols, ACM 
SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV., Aug. 1988, at 106, 106, available at 
www.cs.princeton.edu/~jrex/teaching/spring2005/reading/clark88.pdf.  It would, of 
course, be an oversimplification to label interconnectivity the sole purpose of the 
Internet.  Other goals, such as robustness, supporting a wide range of possible 
applications, demonstrating the feasibility of wide-area packet networking, and 
supporting research applications, were also significant.  Moreover, the Internet we know 
today developed through an evolutionary process, involving many contributors.  
However, effective internetworking was the most significant design element of the 
system.  See id. at 106-10. 
325 The shift from local, purpose-specific networking parallels the shift in the 
computing world from single-function devices such as calculators and word processors to 
general purpose personal computers.  Cf. Zittrain, supra note 137, at 1975-76. 
326 See G. Keith Cambron, The Next Generation Network and Why We’ll Never See It, 
COMM. MAG., Oct. 2006, at 8, 10 (“IP’s greatest contribution is its ability to switch 
information across diverse networks, independent of the underlying technology; the 
greatest legacy of IP is the universal acceptance of the address scheme and message 
structure.”). 
327 See Jon Postel, Info. Sciences Inst., Transmission Control Protocol:  DARPA 
Internet Program Protocol Specification, at ii (Sept. 1981) (Request for Comments No. 
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enhance cooperation among separately managed networks, was:  “be 
conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you accept from others.”328  Most 
of the other technical innovations that allow the Internet to function, such as the 
ingenious congestion management schemes that operate without central 
regulatory mechanisms and the distributed databases supporting the DNS, were 
developed for internetworking.  Even the end-to-end approach, now emphasized 
primarily for its effects on innovation, had its roots in internetworking.  In an 
end-to-end network, connectivity does not depend on enhancements baked into a 
particular network.  Edge devices are free to communicate and establish new 
applications, regardless of what network infrastructure they sit on. 
Significant consequences flow from the fact that interconnectivity, and not 
some other objective, is the baseline goal embedded in the Internet’s architecture.  
The Internet is a complex, engineered system, and such systems necessarily 
involve tradeoffs.329  Had the Internet been designed primarily to ensure 
reliability, security, or effective billing of real-time voice communications traffic, 
it would have turned out quite differently.330  In particular, designs for 
internetworking have to create both incentives and the opportunities for isolated 
systems to come together. 
Describing the Internet in these terms runs counter to the tenor of most 
cyberlaw scholarship.  Because the end-to-end model focuses on the network’s 
edges, it can over-emphasize the degrees of freedom those edges enjoy.331  
Moreover, perspectives that generalize about edges of “the Internet” miss how 
those edges are themselves embedded in component networks that are tightly 
interconnected. 
                                                                                                                                                       
793), http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc793.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).  Postel also 
supervised the assignment of Internet addresses. 
328 Id. at 13. 
329 See Alderson & Willinger, supra note 240, at 94.  The HOT models of network 
development demonstrate how tradeoffs between competing incentives in networks can 
produce instabilities and shape network performance.  See Carlson & Doyle, Mechanism 
for Power, supra note 283, at 1424; Carlson & Doyle, Robustness and Design, supra note 
283, at 2529. 
330 Under those circumstances, the Internet would have looked like the public 
switched telephone network. 
331 Zittrain’s “generativity” model acknowledges that network edges may no longer be 
so unconstrained.  See Zittrain, supra note 137, at 1995-96.  However, his perspective still 
concentrates on the behavior of the edge devices, rather than the network links that tie 
them to networks, and networks to each other. 
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B. Federated Network Effects 
1. Bigger is better 
The clearest reason why an interconnected, federated architecture creates so 
much value on the Internet is the phenomenon of network effects.332  Though it is 
consistent with network formation theory, the economic concept of network 
effects predates the development of network science.333  The basic idea is that 
participants on the network benefit from the presence of other participants.  To 
take a simple example, my friend’s decision to purchase a mobile phone also 
benefits me, because I can now call her more easily.  In economic terms, there is a 
positive externality to her decisions to join the network.  A bigger network is thus 
more valuable, independent of any scale or scope economies for its creators. 
One consequence of network effects is that the network becomes more 
valuable as it grows.334  A bigger network gives users access to more other users, 
and to more content or services that can be delivered through the network.  This 
principle means that growth and interconnectivity magnify the social welfare 
benefits of the Internet.  In this environment, the benefit to each user grows with 
additional users.  A group of distinct networks, such as the consumer online 
services that were prevalent immediately before the rise of the Internet, may in 
aggregate connect the same number of users.  However, each user will have 
access to a smaller universe of other users, or of services on the network 
platform.  The overall utility of this network configuration will be inferior to the 
Internet, which connects all users.335 
                                                        
332 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 41, at 483 (“‘Network effects’ refers to a group 
of theories clustered around the question whether and to what extent standard economic 
theory must be altered in cases in which ‘the utility that a user derives from consumption 
of a good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good.’”). 
333 The foundational work on network effects in information industries was 
performed in the 1980s.  See ARTHUR, supra note 35, at 1-4; Michael L. Katz & Carl 
Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 
424 (1985); see also SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 189, at 173-225 (detailing economic 
implications of “positive feedback” in network industries). 
334 See STEVEN M. SURANOVIC, Chapter 80-1:  Economies of Scale and Returns to 
Scale, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND POLICY, http://internationalecon.com/ 
Trade/Tch80/ T80-1.php (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). 
335 The issue is not just the scale and scope efficiencies of larger networks.  These are 
questions of supply-side economies, which classical economics has long considered.  
Network effects is a demand-side phenomenon.  See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 41, 
at 484. 
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These network effects also suggest that, even absent anti-competitive 
behavior, network industries may tend toward concentration.  New entrants may 
find it difficult to catch an early market leader, because the larger network is 
inherently more valuable to users.  Network effects have been used to explain 
how AT&T gained a commanding advantage in the early days of telephone service 
over smaller independent telephone companies, how Microsoft built and 
preserved a monopoly in personal computer operating systems, and how social 
networking site MySpace achieved a dominant market position, even facing high-
profile competitors.336 
2. Benefits of federation 
In a 1998 article, Mark Lemley and David McGowan surveyed the 
implications of network effects for various areas of the law.337  They concluded 
that, although network effects offer significant insights in fields such as antitrust, 
intellectual property, and communications law, courts and regulators often apply 
the concept carelessly or incorrectly.338  In adversarial legal processes, partisans 
are incentivized to stretch the postulates of network effects theory to match their 
desired outcomes, sometimes beyond what the theory can justify.339  Moreover, 
network effects themselves are often indeterminate.  In real-world situations, 
their implications depend more on the particular dynamics of the relevant 
industry than on the general principles of the formal model.340  Lemley and 
McGowan therefore urged a cautious approach to incorporating network effects 
into the law, adopting the least sweeping rule consistent with the theory.341 
There has been significant legal and economic scholarship on the implications 
of network effects for telecommunications and the Internet.342  As Lemley and 
McGowan explain, network effects do not necessarily mean that the largest player 
                                                        
336 See id. at 549-51. 
337 See id. 
338 See id. at 609-11. 
339 See id. at 562. 
340 See id. at 609-11.  This parallels the criticism leveled by Spulber and Yoo.  They 
point out that the primary variable determining the magnitude of network effects — the 
size of the network — is often too coarse to be useful for policy determinations.  As they 
note, the structure of networks, which graph theory models, may be more significant than 
their size in many cases.  See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 229, at 1690-92. 
341 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 41, at 593. 
342 See id. at 546-61. 
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will dominate potential competitors.343  In a networked system such as the 
Internet, network effects push toward a single universal platform.344  However, 
that need not be a monopoly network controlled by a single provider.  When 
compatible standards allow networks to interconnect and federate, a single 
internetwork such as the Internet or today’s multi-provider telecommunications 
market is an equally valid configuration.345  The durability of the Internet 
backbone market as a relatively competitive environment is testament to the fact 
that the rich do not always get richer. 
In other words, the network effects literature suggests that, in a networked 
environment such as the Internet, there are powerful incentives toward either of 
two potential market structures: a single dominant firm, or an interconnected 
environment of many firms using common standards.  The Internet has 
primarily, but not exclusively, followed the latter path.  As explained above, the 
network was from the beginning designed for standardized interconnection, and 
for many years it was operated under cultural and economic conditions that 
reinforced that structure.346  For applications, the common standards of the Web 
and the separation of applications from connectivity create an environment of 
easy entry.347  However, other aspects of the network are more centralized.  For 
example, consolidation of power in the Internet backbone has raised antitrust 
concerns.348  And the Internet addressing system points back to central “root 
                                                        
343 See id. at 506. 
344 See id. 
345 See id. at 549. 
346 The exception was the NSFNet backbone, through which all traffic flowed.  The 
NSFNet privatization process replaced that central hub with the mesh of competing 
backbones that characterizes the Internet today. See generally Kesan & Shaw, supra note 
79 (describing the privatization process), 
347 One of the reasons the Web triumphed was that a competing application platform 
unwisely attempted to exert centralized control.  The University of Minnesota tried to 
impose licensing fees based on its copyrights in Gopher, a popular Internet navigation 
service in the early 1990s.  That scared away many sites from adopting it.  See Posting of 
Yen & Minnesota Gopher Team, yen@boombox.micro.umn.edu, to pacs-l@ uhupvm1.uh. 
edu, review@msen.com, com-priv@uu.psi.com (Mar. 11, 1993, 15:08:26 CST) 
(http://www.mirrorservice.org/sites/boombox.micro.umn.edu/pub/gopher/gopher-
software-licensing-policy.ancient). 
348 See Complaint at 9-11, United States v. WorldCom, No. 00-CV-1526 (D.D.C. June 
26, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f5000/5051.pdf. 
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servers” managed by one company under an agreement with the U.S. Department 
of Commerce.349 
The victory of the interconnected outcomes over the centralized ones was 
always contingent on historical, regulatory, economic, and cultural factors.  The 
economics of network effects therefore provide a basis for understanding both 
the power of the composite Internet, as well as its fragility.  With that in mind, 
policy makers can begin to formulate effective responses to the Internet’s 
creeping balkanization. 
C. Network Science Meets Network Law 
This subpart develops some initial ideas for linking the insights in the prior 
Parts with normative policy making.  Subpart 1 explains the challenge the policy 
makers face in the interconnected Internet environment.  Subpart 2 shows how 
government action and inaction played a role in many of the stories of federation 
and balkanization described in Part II.  Subpart 3 highlights some early efforts to 
apply network models directly to policy-relevant questions. 
1. The challenge for law 
Traditional legal approaches struggle to explain the fissures emerging on the 
Internet today because they are not sensitive enough to the underlying network 
structures.  The primary legal construct for addressing concentrations of power is 
antitrust law.  Antitrust enforcement and analogous administrative regulation 
have been used in some high-profile cases involving networked industries, such 
as the effort to break up Microsoft.350  As the Microsoft case demonstrated, 
however, the application of traditional antitrust concepts becomes extremely 
challenging in a networked environment.351  The problem is magnified on the 
Internet, which is not one networked platform but many platforms tied together 
in a complex federation.  Moreover, antitrust is designed to break up firms, not 
pull them closer together.  Yet, as discussed above, the great value of the Internet 
                                                        
349 See supra Part II.A. 
350 See supra note 54. 
351 See Joseph Farrell & Phil Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open 
Access Policies:  Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet 
Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 89 (2003) (describing challenges facing antitrust in 
networked “platform” environments, and proposing new framework based on 
“internalizing complementary efficiencies”). 
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lies in its penchant for connecting systems into common platforms.352  Mandated 
fragmentation may reduce market power, as traditionally conceived, but it would 
only magnify the balkanization of the Internet. 
Similarly, traditional notions of property rights fail to capture the Internet 
environment.  The Internet is chock full of private property, from the servers that 
host its data to the patents that protect particular algorithms.  Yet no one owns 
the Internet.  Again, it is the network of networks that emerges from the 
voluntary integration of largely private resources.  The Internet is a commons, 
which produces value and even facilitates market interactions through the 
absence of exclusive property rights.353 
When these paradigms collide, the result is legal uncertainty.  Book 
publishers alarmed at Google’s new Book Search service are correct that Google 
stores full-text copies of their copyrighted works on its servers.354  At the same 
time, Google is correct that it is providing a new mechanism for discovery of 
books, just as it facilitates discovery of several billion other copyrighted 
documents on the Web.  The courts will resolve this and other disputes with the 
tools at hand, but the absence of network-centric frameworks is a significant 
handicap. 
In a networked environment, location and connectivity within the network 
matter.  A more secure foundation for Internet law must start with the 
recognition that Internet is a composite networked environment. 
2. Defining the government role 
Network science provides more than just useful analogies to aid in resolution 
of Internet-related legal disputes.  It offers new tools to assess policy alternatives 
for some of the most significant issues in the information economy.355  The 
Internet is a network.  It is within the class of phenomena that network science 
studies.  The only difference is that science is fundamentally descriptive, whereas 
law is normative.  Network science observes the patterns of networks in nature 
and tries to explain how and why they behave as they do.  Law evaluates the 
success of networks in achieving normative goals, and then considers how their 
                                                        
352 See supra Part II.A. 
353 See LESSIG, supra note 194, at 26.  See generally Frischmann, supra note 37 
(analyzing economic implications of commons for Internet infrastructure regulation). 
354 See Travis, supra note 206, at 131-39. 
355 See supra Part III. 
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performance might be improved.  That process, however, can still benefit from a 
clear understanding of how networks operate. 
The project of marrying network science with Internet law is at the early 
stages.  Even on its own terms, network formation theory has only begun to 
incorporate many attributes of real-world networks into its models.  Its 
explanatory or normative value will depend greatly on the particular issues under 
consideration.  A closer look at several of the case studies in Part II shows that 
public policy often has a significant impact.  Reviewing these examples provides a 
few generalizations about how network science can inform decision making on 
significant Internet law and policy questions. 
A key lesson of network science is that the structure of network interactions 
can be extremely important.356  The same set of actors may produce different 
outcomes depending on the dynamics of their network relationships.  By 
precluding some linkages, strengthening or weakening others, and mandating 
others, both governmental and non-governmental regulators mediated the 
potential excesses of the centralizing Internet. 
The NSF’s Internet commercialization and privatization effort was 
deliberately structured to ensure competition among multiple interconnected 
backbones.357  By funding the creation of network access points (“NAPs”) and 
forcing the privatized NSFNet backbone to connect to them, the NSF prevented 
the most powerful backbone from leveraging network effects to cement its 
dominance.358  The default requirement of multilateral peering at the NAPs 
provided a baseline around which networks could establish more sophisticated 
private relationships.  After the NSF exited the stage, the Department of Justice 
and FCC, and more recently the competition policy arm of the European Union, 
became the primary watchdogs of competitiveness in the backbone market.  
Through divestiture requirements and occasional outright prohibitions on 
mergers, these government entities helped to preserve a backbone environment 
that is both competitive and well connected.359 
                                                        
356 See Jackson, supra note 24, at 319. 
357 See Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, The Privatization of the Internet’s Backbone 
Network, 51 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 93, 95-96, 100, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6836/is_/ai_n25007515. 
358 See Kesan & Shaw, supra note 79, at 111-16. 
359 See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake:  Connecting Internet Backbones 18-
20 (FCC Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 32, Sept. 2000), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp32.pdf.  
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Government took a similarly assertive, although less visible, role in holding 
together the other layers of the Internet.  In addressing, the private governance 
mechanisms of Jon Postel’s Internet Assigned Numbers Authority were for many 
years sufficient for universal adoption of a common platform.  Once those 
consensual institutions broke down, the Department of Commerce and ICANN 
took on the mantle of Internet governance.  Despite ICANN’s many failings, 
breakaway efforts and movements to wrest control over the root servers have so 
far been unsuccessful. 
At the application layer, the neutral Internet, in which access providers did 
not interfere with applications and content on their networks, grew out of a series 
of FCC decisions to limit the power of network operators.  Finally, in content, the 
safe harbors of the DMCA and Telecom Act provided cover for practices such as 
search engine indexing of Web content.  These provisions could not have been 
written with the intention of addressing the kinds of content sharing that sprung 
up after they were adopted.  Nonetheless, they are becoming increasingly 
significant in the legal calculus for major new Internet-based services such as 
YouTube and Google Book Search.360  The statutory safe harbors, along with the 
broader fair use exception to copyright liability, provide breathing space for 
online content aggregation services that might otherwise run afoul of copyright 
silos. 
Government has not always been a positive force.  The NSI monopoly over 
generic top-level domain name registration was entirely a creation of the NSF.  
The tensions and uncertainties in copyright law and its application to online 
services like Google Book Search result from a combination of action and inaction 
by both the legislative and judicial branches of government.  The potential 
balkanization of IPv6 implementation juxtaposes two governances systems.  The 
IETF is inclusive but weak in its attempts to push a universal transition to IPv6, 
while the top-down Chinese IPv6 effort is ruthlessly effective.   Most of the stories 
described above in Part II about the breakdown of the composite Internet involve 
governments or governmental institutions as at least contributing factors. 
3. Early analytical work 
There have been some efforts to analyze issues relevant to Internet policy 
using network formation theory techniques, albeit not with a legal focus.  These 
                                                        
360 See Tim Wu, Does YouTube Really Have Legal Problems?, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2006, 
http://slate.com/id/2152264. 
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have predominantly been in the area of peering.361  For example, researchers 
developed a strategic network formation model for the decisions of Internet 
backbone networks about whether to peer with one another directly or through a 
public exchange point.362  The model showed how network operators would seek 
to differentiate their service quality and engage in price discrimination to 
maximize revenues, while end-users would prefer a more undifferentiated 
environment.363  This mirrors the kinds of conflicts actually emerging among 
Internet backbones. 
The differentiated services outcome that backbone operators favor is not 
necessarily the wrong one from a public policy perspective; the question is 
whether the overall benefits (in terms of service innovation and investment in 
network capacity) exceed the costs (in terms of increased costs for users).  A more 
refined model would recognize that physical-layer interconnection also influences 
application-layer opportunities, because application and service providers 
connect to backbones as well.  Again, network formation theory will not offer a 
clear-cut suggestion for every Internet policy question.  As the scientific field 
matures, however, it will offer increasingly valuable guidance about the likely 
consequences of intervention into Internet markets. 
D. Guidelines for Policy Makers 
As a threshold matter, regulators must appreciate what about the Internet 
they can and cannot control.  Nodes in networks benefit not only from their direct 
connections, but from the number and structure of indirect relationships as well.  
Individuals and entire networks will react to any external stimuli in the form of 
regulatory impositions.  The results may be unpredictable, even harmful.364 
Achieving a defined policy outcome may not be nearly as simple as it seems. 
                                                        
361 See generally Alessio D’Ignazio & Emanuele Giovannetti, From Exogenous to 
Endogenous Economic Networks:  Internet Applications, 20 J. ECON. SURVS. 757 (2006) 
(explanatory paren); W.B. Norton, The Art of Peering:  The Peering Playbook, 
http://www.blogg.ch/uploads/peering-playbook.pdf (describing the business dynamics 
of peering decisions). 
362 See Narine Badasyan & Subhadip Chakrabarti, Private Peering Among Internet 
Backbone Providers 2-5 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis, Series on Indus. Org., Econ. Working 
Paper Archive, No. 0301002, 2003). 
363 See id. at 21-22. 
364 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 229, at 1713-16 (criticizing FCC’s interconnection 
pricing rules for incumbent telephone companies through graph-theoretic analysis). 
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Governments can play two primary positive roles in the evolution of the 
Internet ecosystem:  catalyzing network formation, and moderating the forces 
that push towards excessive concentration of power.  The first thing governments 
can do is to promote the growth of networks themselves.  Government action can 
reduce both the internal costs of adding links to a network and the external costs 
of linking networks together.365  The DARPA and NSF initiatives to fund what 
ultimately became the Internet are canonical examples.  Today, with the 
commercial sector so heavily engaged in the Internet, such direct support is 
unnecessary.  However, there is room for additional investment in basic research 
on the foundations of networks at all layers.  Moreover, with only a limited 
number of broadband competitors, FCC policies geared towards formation of new 
network platforms could have a significant impact.366 
The second government function is to prevent networks from becoming their 
own worst enemies.  Complex adaptive systems are characterized by “tipping 
points,” where change suddenly accelerates and becomes difficult to stop.367  The 
phase transitions in network growth368 and the potential “lock-in” effects of 
network effects369 are examples of this pattern.  At certain key moments, aspects 
of the Internet may tip toward either concentration of power or interconnected 
competition, or even toward the sub-optimal outcome of unconnected islands. 
This is the story of peering archipelagos, IPv6 balkanization, DNS fragmentation, 
network neutrality vs. diversity, and islands of copyright protection, which are 
detailed above in Part II.A-D. 
Networks do not necessarily tend towards the overall state that is the most 
efficient, welfare maximizing, or socially beneficial.370  Network structures on the 
Internet are the product of strategic decisions by many independent agents, who 
focus on their own perceived interests rather than those of society.  In general, 
                                                        
365 See Jackson, supra note 248, at 13-14; supra Part III.B.2. 
366 Such policies would have more than just economic benefits.  As Susan Crawford 
explains in a recent paper, communications policy should emphasize the broader 
opportunities of additional human communication.  See Crawford, supra note 39, at 364-
65. 
367 See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT:  HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG 
DIFFERENCE 12 (2000). 
368 See Jackson, supra note 248, at 12-15. 
369 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 41, at 501, 522. 
370 See generally Jackson & Wolinsky, supra note 270 (using game-theoretic 
techniques to analyze network formation, and distinguishing network stability from 
network efficiency). 
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such decentralized, market processes produce remarkably good results, for both 
economic efficiency and for normative measures of individual welfare.371 
On the other hand, market systems can go off the rails.  They can produce 
inequality, excessive swings in the business cycle, durable monopolies, or other 
undesirable results.  A small example is the desire of telephone companies to 
impose per-minute charges on dial-up ISPs in the mid-1990s.372  Had the FCC 
granted this request, the resultant dampening of Internet growth would have far 
exceeded the costs of the switch upgrades the phone companies ultimately 
adopted.  The phone companies themselves would have suffered, because they 
would not have enjoyed the increased demand for second lines, data circuits, and 
eventually broadband connections for Internet access.  Fortunately, the FCC 
declined to act on the requests. 
In general, government policies that promote cheaper access to network links, 
encourage standardization, and restrain excessive concentrations of power at any 
layer of the network, may help restrain the inherent pressures for the Internet to 
either over-centralize or balkanize.  As the discussion of network science 
demonstrated, factors such as the density of links relative to the number of 
nodes, the cost of links, and the overall size of the network strongly influence the 
path that the network will take.  Much work remains to map these general 
concepts to practical choices in specific regulatory proceedings.  However, these 
guidelines provide a solid baseline for policy making grounded in fundamental 
network dynamics. 
CONCLUSION 
The story of the Internet is still being written.  Though the federation of 
distinct networks and the resulting aggregation of power in new hubs were often 
design goals, in practice they emerged from the complex interactions of 
independent actors.  Thoughtful policy decisions may help preserve the better 
attributes of an open, interconnected network platform, but there are no 
guarantees.  A fragmented Internet would forfeit many of the positive network 
                                                        
371 See generally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (explaining 
superiority of decentralized market-based economies over centralized socialist 
approaches). 
372 See Werbach, supra note 42, at 48-51. 
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effects that have driven extraordinary growth in innovation over the past decade.  
Uniformity, however, also imposes costs.  Some balkanization of the Internet may 
create space for experimentation and incentives for new kinds of innovation.  The 
potential value of such developments should be weighed against the potential 
costs and uncertainties inherent in such a course.  Network science can help 
policy makers make better choices for the future of the world’s most important 
information and communications platform. 
 
